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ABSTRACT 
 
 
A Comparative Study of America's Entries into World War I and World War II 
 
 
 
 
by 
 
Samantha Alisha Taylor  
 
 
This thesis studies events that preceded America‟s entries into the First and Second World Wars 
to discover similarities and dissimilarities.  Comparing America‟s entries into the World Wars 
provides an insight into major events that influenced future ones and changed America. 
 
Research was conducted from primary sources of Presidents Woodrow Wilson and Franklin D. 
Roosevelt.  In addition, secondary sources were used that study the events preceding America‟s 
entries into World War I and World War II.  Research was also conducted on public opinion. 
 
In World War I, German actions angered Wilson and segments of the American public, 
persuading Wilson to ask for a declaration of war.  While German aggression shaped American 
opinion in World War II, Japanese action forced the United States to enter the war.  In both 
cases, the tone of aggression that molded the foreign policy of Presidents Wilson and Roosevelt 
and shaped American public opinion originated from Germany. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
The Great War began in August 1914, and for the first three years, it was a European 
War.  The United States entered the Great War on 6 April 1917, changing it into a World War.  
The US entered the World War in response to German actions that cost American lives and 
violated neutral rights.  The promise that the Great War would be the war to end all wars was 
broken with Adolf Hitler‟s conquests in Europe and Japan‟s invasion of Asia that began the 
Second World War.  America would be drawn into this war as well, but unlike WWI it would not 
be German actions but a Japanese attack on US Naval Forces on 7 December 1941. 
The US entered World War I and World War II due to the aggressive actions of Germany 
and Japan respectively.  The American intervention has been questioned in both wars.  The 
American intervention of WWI has been questioned because of US financial ties with Britain, 
this was later used to keep the US isolated before World War II.  The US entry into WWII has 
been questioned because of the personal relationship between President Franklin D. Roosevelt 
and British Prime Minister Winston Churchill. 
Most of the resources used for WWI focused on the economic ties between the US and 
the Entente during WWI as a primary reason the US entered the war.  These sources argue that 
by allowing the Entente to have unlimited access to American trade during WWI and later obtain 
loans to pay for these purchases forced the US to enter the war to ensure that the Entente would 
repay their debts.  These sources provide detailed information on America‟s entry beyond this 
argument, but they overlook that the main reason the US entered the war was the German use of 
submarine warfare.  These sources also note the pro-Entente and pro-British sympathies that the 
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majority of Americans, including President Wilson and his administration, had during the war.  
World War II resources provide a less biased view of American intervention; however, biases 
still exist in some arguments.  Some of the more prolific arguments are that Roosevelt wanted 
the US to enter WWII, that Roosevelt was influenced by Churchill, and that Roosevelt‟s policies 
toward Germany and Japan forced Japan to attack the US.   
This study is not to support, contradict, or further any of these arguments; its purpose is 
to study America‟s entries into the World Wars by comparing similarities and dissimilarities in 
events leading to the US entries.  This study focuses on Presidents Woodrow Wilson‟s and 
Franklin D. Roosevelt‟s war policies and actual events during the wars.  These areas were most 
influential to American intervention by determining when the US supported acting in the war and 
when the US was physically willing to enter the war.   
America‟s intervention into the World Wars had many factors; however, this study 
focuses on the comparison of events that led to a similar situation in WWI and WWII that 
influenced America‟s entry.  The main catalysts for the US entry into the wars were actions by 
the belligerents:  Germany‟s use of unrestricted submarine warfare that caused the deaths of 
American citizens and Japan‟s attack on the US Naval Forces at Pearl Harbor Hawaii on 7 
December 1941.   
These events were deciding factors in America‟s course during the wars, but they were 
partially influenced by Wilson and Roosevelt.  These two presidents implemented war policies in 
a manner that was originally designed to keep the US out of the wars, but eventually these 
policies changed under the impact of the war in Europe and Asia.  Wilson‟s policy was designed 
not only to keep the US out of the war; it was also designed to initiate a peaceful settlement 
between the belligerents, which was abandoned when Germany began unrestricted submarine 
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warfare.  Roosevelt‟s original policy was also designed to keep the US out of war but it was 
ultimately adapted to provide Britain with supplies and aid. 
The final influence on the US interventions was public opinion.  Public opinion in the 
years prior to the US entering the wars was completely against America intervening.  This 
opinion changed during the wars to supporting the war declarations.  The democratic nature of 
the US requires that the national majority support these options, but it does not require 
unanimous support, which was important during WWI.  The nature of public support during 
WWI was one that reluctantly accepted the war, although a minority remained attached to 
pacifism.  Public opinion in WWII was also not one of unity; however, the attack on Pearl 
Harbor provided unanimous support for entering the war. 
The US entry into the First and Second World Wars was based on a mixture of these 
three factors.  These factors would work to determine how the US would enter the war as well as 
when.  Public opinion, presidential policies, and foreign events while dissimilar during each war, 
caused similar responses in America that led the US to enter World War I and World War II. 
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CHAPTER 2 
WORLD WAR I 
 
In the summer of 1914, events transpired in Europe that ruptured world peace.  Following 
the assassination of Austro-Hungarian Archduke Franz Ferdinand in Sarajevo, the major nations 
of Europe declared war against each other.  These events were viewed in the United States first 
with disinterest and later disappointment.  At the outset of hostilities, most Americans failed to 
grasp the ramifications a European war had on America. 
On 1 August 1914, the first war declaration was issued and by 10 August, England, 
France, and Russia announced themselves as the Triple Entente opposing Austria-Hungary and 
Germany, known as the Central Powers.  On 4 August, President Woodrow Wilson issued a 
statement that declared the US a neutral nation in the war.  On 10 August, Wilson appealed to the 
American public to act and speak in accordance with strict neutrality.  He warned Americans 
against breaking American neutrality and having sympathies for one side over the other.
1
 
 
Britain Tries to Control Trade 
About the same time Wilson called for American neutrality, the British government had 
decided to establish a blockade of the Central Powers.  The British blockade was established in 
an attempt to halt all trade to and from the Central Powers.  The British blockade was the first 
problem Wilson‟s neutral policy encountered, as demonstrated by British determination to 
maintain the blockade in spite of American protests.  Wilson‟s attempts to get the belligerents to 
                                               
1 Woodrow Wilson, “An Appeal to the American People,” May 6-September 5, 1914, vol. 30 of The 
Papers, edited by Arthur S. Link, David W. Hirst and John E. Little, Edith James, and Sylvia Elvin (Princeton:  
Princeton University Press, 1979) 393-394. 
10 
 
accept the 1909 Declaration of London was his first attempt to gain British acceptance of 
American rights.  The British government objected to the Declaration because it restricted the 
British ability to extend the blockade beyond blockaded ports and coasts.  The Declaration also 
prohibited the use of the continuous voyage that allowed a belligerent to stop a ship if it believed 
the cargoes final destination was to an enemy regardless of its initial port destination.  The 
principle of continuous voyage was used by the British and United States prior to World War I.
2
 
 
German Submarine Warfare 
During World War I, the British blockade denied the German government the use of most 
of its surface fleet, leaving it only one naval weapon that could be used—the submarine.  The use 
of the German submarine was initially restricted because of questions over classifying the 
submarine as a different type of cruiser.  The decision to use the submarine was due to events 
that occurred on 5 September 1914.  On 5 September, the German submarine U-9 sank three 
British battle cruisers.
3
  
 The success of the attack quickly gained recognition from German officials who decided 
to begin submarine attacks.  It was not until 4 February that Germany decided to use the 
submarine as a weapon against British trade.  On 4 February, Germany declared the coast off 
Britain and the English Channel a war zone.  They announced that merchant ships travelling into 
the war zone risked attack and while steps would be taken to avoid neutral ships, the British use 
                                               
2
 C. Hartley Grattan, Why We Fought (Indianapolis:  Bobbs-Merrill, 1969) 203-204 
3 Ross Gregory, The Origins of American Intervention in the First World War (New York:  Norton, 1971) 
47-48. 
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of neutral flags made it impossible for Germany to guarantee the safety of neutral merchant 
ships.
4
   
The success of the U-9 created a positive weapon against the British blockade.  However, 
submarine warfare was a new method of naval warfare that could raise moral and legal issues.  
Germany decided the risks were acceptable due to the starvation from the British blockade and 
the lack of neutral protests against the starvation of the German people.
5
  In spite of the German 
government‟s decision, the US government protested the submarine campaign.  Wilson replied 
that the US would hold the German government strictly accountable for its actions with the 
submarine.
6
 
When Germany declared the war zone, it noted that Britain‟s use of neutral flags exposed 
neutral ships to German attacks; Wilson took notice of the claim and replied to Britain.  Wilson‟s 
note to the British was a mildly stated argument that the British use of the American flag gave 
British ships no protection while endangering American ships.  It greatly differed from the 
protests issued by the other neutral nations that expressly demanded that British ships not sail 
their flags to avoid attack.
7
 
The German government began submarine warfare in retaliation against the British Order 
in Council in December 1914.  The Order in Council expanded the contraband list from twelve 
                                               
4 Alice M. McDiarmid, The American Defense of Neutral Rights, 1914-1917 (Cambridge:  Harvard 
University Press, 1939) 52-53. 
5 Gregory, Origins of American Intervention, 48-49. 
6 McDiarmid, American Defense, 52-53. 
7 McDiarmid, American Defense, 54-55. 
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to twenty-nine items and abolished the difference between conditional and absolute contraband.
8
  
Eventually Germany would become frustrated with its inability to contest the British blockade, 
gain American acquiescence to its policies, or gain diplomatic assistance from neutral nations, in 
particular the US.
9
 
Prior to the German submarine campaign, the main obstacle to American foreign policy 
was the British blockade and its effect on American trade with Europe.  The commencement of 
submarine warfare with its impartial sinking of war ships and merchant ships, enemy and neutral 
alike, became the main obstacle to American foreign trade and foreign policy.  While German 
submarine warfare took priority in American foreign policy, British attempts to control trade to 
Europe often forced Wilson to address American grievances with Britain. 
 
American War Policies 
From 1914 to 1915, American trade was hurt by the British blockade.  It was not until 
1916 when the US conceded to the blockade that the American economy began to profit from the 
war.  At this point American trade had been adopted to supply the Allies needs because they 
were the only nations to which they could ship supplies.  As American trade adapted, Wilson 
was forced to reconsider a portion of his neutral policy.
10
  In August 1914, in accordance with 
strict neutrality, Wilson announced that American banks were not to grant loans to belligerents.  
In October 1914, this policy was altered to allow commercial or credit loans to the belligerents.  
                                               
8 Contraband are those items that are illegal to ship to countries at war.  Conditional contraband are those 
items that are considered contraband in certain forms like chemicals and raw materials, and their military or civilian 
applications.  Absolute contraband are those items that are always contraband regardless of form or application. 
9 Gregory, Origins of American Intervention, 46-47. 
10
 Grattan, Why We Fought, 140.   
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By allowing the belligerents to gain American loans, Wilson allowed further acquiescence to 
British control of trade in Europe.  While the US acquiesced to most of British control, it did not 
do so quietly as the Wilson administration sent the British government repeated protests against 
its policies.
11
  
Germany issued its first protest against continued American munitions shipments in 
December 1914, mainly because it aided the Entente against Germany.  In June 1915, Austria-
Hungary also protested American munitions trade to the Entente.  Prior to these protests, the 
Central Powers had accepted American munitions trades to Europe.
12
  However, as the British 
blockade ensured that only the Entente benefitted from American munitions the Central Powers 
became hostile to it and began protesting.  In addition, Wilson and his administration believed 
that any change in the current policy would have been contrary to neutrality, this opinion was 
aided by American biases against the Central Powers, especially those against Germany due to 
its submarine campaign.
13
 
 
American Response to Submarine Warfare 
During the war, the Central and Entente Powers both conducted policies that angered the 
US.  However, the German government‟s initiation of submarine warfare was a greater factor 
than the British blockade.  From March 1915 to March 1917, the deaths of American citizens on 
torpedoed or sunken ships eventually forced America to enter WWI.  Throughout the war, 
Germany‟s submarine campaign was a greater factor in determining America‟s intervention in 
                                               
11 McDiarmid, American Defense, 22-23. 
12 McDiarmid, American Defense, 57. 
13 Grattan, Why We Fought, 152. 
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WWI than any other issue.  During the war, Wilson‟s decisions against the German policy placed 
Germany in an unattainable position. 
On 28 March 1915, the British ship Falaba was torpedoed by a German submarine 
causing the death of Leon C. Thrasher.  The Thrasher incident was the first case where the 
Wilson administration denounced the submarine attacks as violations of international law and 
humanity.  On 7 May 1915, the British liner the Lusitania was sunk off the Irish coast causing 
the deaths of 128 American citizens.  Following the sinking of the Lusitania, the German and 
American government entered into negotiations, and eventually Germany agreed to restrict its 
submarine campaign.
14
  On November 1915, the Ancona was torpedoed by a German submarine 
flying the Austro-Hungarian flag.  This incident was resolved with the Austrian government 
providing assurances that it would conduct submarine warfare as the Germans did.  By January 
1916, German-American relations were reaching an impasse; still, the two nations reached an 
accord in which the German government limited its submarine campaign to attacking cruisers.
15
  
The US viewed this compromise as ensuring that the submarine issue was resolved.  At the same 
time, Britain had begun to arm its merchant ships and use decoys or “Q-ships” to attack 
submarines.  The British policy made it suicide for submarines to obey the rules of cruiser 
warfare and observe international laws regarding the warning and searching of merchant ships.   
During the war, both Britain and Germany used legal arguments to support their policies, 
yet the British were better able to gain American acquiescence to its legal arguments.  This was 
because the British blockade policy seized American ships; it did not violate American morality 
or humanitarian principles.  On the other hand, German arguments referred to British policies to 
                                               
14 Walter Millis, Road to War; America 1914-1917 (New York:  H. Fertig, 1970) 240-241. 
15 McDiarmid, American Defense, 58-62, 120-123. 
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defend submarine warfare, but their submarine attacks offended American moral convictions and 
humanitarian principles.  British orders to arm merchant ships to attack submarines in 1915, 
forced the German government to renew its submarine campaign against armed merchant ships 
on 1 February 1916.
16
 
On 10 February, Germany issued orders to attack armed merchant ships without warning.  
On 24 March, the Sussex an unarmed merchant ship was torpedoed by a German submarine.  
Interestingly, no American lives were lost in the attack; however, Wilson protested the attack and 
increased his protests against German submarines.  Wilson responded by demanding that 
Germany completely cease its submarine campaign because the German government was either 
unable or unwilling to control its submarine commanders.  Following this, Wilson decided to 
send demands to Britain to amend its blockade policy.  Wilson sent the note to Britain in an 
attempt to preserve diplomatic relations with Germany by demonstrating that the US government 
held Britain and Germany to the same standard.  While, this failed Germany still ended its 
submarine campaign.
17
 
Final Moves for Peace Fail 
In the autumn of 1916, the war situation and internal politics in Germany initiated a chain 
of events that would bring the US into the war.  By this time, the war in Europe had progressed 
into a full war of attrition.  Still both sides refused to accept peace negotiations in spite of the fact 
that both sides were nearing exhaustion in attempts to gain a military victory.
18
  In this 
environment, the German government began debating whether it was more favorable to its 
                                               
16 Millis, Road to War, 262-267. 
17 McDiarmid, American Defense, 110-111, 125-126, 133. 
18
 Charles Callan Tansill, America Goes to War (Boston:  Little, Brown and Company, 1938) 627-629. 
16 
 
situation to avoid actions that would bring America into the war or resume attacks with its 
submarines.  In September, Germany informed Wilson that unless he could convince the Entente 
to accept a peace settlement by the end of 1916 Germany would resume submarine warfare.
19
   
At the same time, German Ambassador to the US Count Johann von Bernstorff adjusted 
his diplomatic talks with the US to reflect this decision.  Bernstorff urged Wilson to initiate a 
peace conference between the Entente Powers, the Central Powers, and the neutral nations.  The 
Entente refused the gestures as they were passionately against any early peace settlement with 
the Central Powers.  The Entente decision influenced Germany‟s decision to begin unrestricted 
submarine warfare.  On 24 October, Wilson received information that the German government 
would no longer wait for Wilson to convince the Entente Powers to accept a peace settlement.  
Around 4 November, German navy and army officials had decided that German submarines 
should attack British and American and other neutral ships.   
In spite of this news, Wilson continued to conduct peace talks between the two sides in 
the hopes of initiating a peace conference.  By January after peace negotiations with the Entente 
Powers failed, officials in the German government decided that it was necessary to conduct 
unrestricted submarine warfare in 1917.
20
  Wilson also concluded by this time that the US could 
no longer remain neutral.  These actions influenced Wilson to demand the war‟s end or the US 
would exit neutrality and fight against Germany, yet Wilson received advice that caused him to 
postpone this announcement until December.
21
 
 
                                               
19 McDiarmid, American Defense, 158-159. 
20
 Tansill, America Goes, 628-630. 
21 Harry Notter, The Origins of the Foreign Policy of Woodrow Wilson (New York:  Russell & Russell Inc., 
1965) 560-561, 572. 
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British-American Relations Decline 
While German actions were the actual determining factor that instigated American 
intervention in WWI, British conduct during the war did not increase American support for the 
Entente Powers.  In the summer of 1916, British-American relations reached their lowest point 
during the war.  The first issue was the British anger over Wilson‟s 27 May speech in which he 
reiterated American neutrality and disinterest in the belligerents‟ reasons for the war.  Another 
issue was the Entente‟s Economic Conference from 14 June to 17 June that created American 
anger against additional Entente attempts to maintain its control over trade to Europe.
22
   
This was followed by the publication of the British blacklist on 18 July.  The American 
public vehemently opposed the blacklist even though it was directed against German- and 
Austrian-Americans.  In spite of this, the blacklist was the final “British blunder” that Wilson 
would allow.
23
  While developing a response, Wilson‟s administration split over adopting a tone 
of conciliation or remonstration of which Wilson supported conciliation, especially as he was 
more willing to make allowances for Britain‟s violations of US neutrality.  In response, Wilson 
gained powers from Congress to prohibit British or Entente ships from using American harbors if 
they refused American cargo.  This forced Britain to accede to American demands, the only time 
it happened during the war.  Due to massive opposition from the US, the blacklist became 
Britain‟s final attempt to control American trade to Europe though it continued to prevent US 
trade with the Central Powers.
24
 
 
                                               
22 Notter, Origins of Foreign Policy, 538-540. 
23 Tansill, America Goes, 535-542. 
24 Notter, Origins of Foreign Policy, 545. 
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Towards World War I 
Between January and April 1917, events progressed that brought the US out of neutrality 
and into World War I.  On 9 January 1917, the German government issued orders to commence 
unrestricted submarine warfare.  On 1 February, the German government ordered its submarines 
to conduct unrestricted attacks on ships off the British coast and in the English Channel.  On 4 
February, Wilson ordered diplomatic relations with Germany severed.  On 26 February, the 
British government gave Wilson a copy of a telegram from the German Secretary of Foreign 
Affairs Arthur Zimmermann to the Mexican government.  In the telegram, Zimmermann 
proposed an alliance with Mexico offering the territories of Texas, New Mexico, and Arizona if 
the Mexican government would invade the US.  The Zimmermann telegram created the greatest 
backlash against Germany since the sinking of the Lusitania.
25
 
Between 12 March and 21 March, eight American ships were sunk during Germany‟s 
unrestricted submarine campaign.  These acts were the final overt measures that pressed Wilson 
to get Congressional approval to declare war against Germany.  On 21 March, Wilson instructed 
his administration to construct legislation for Congress to be presented on 2 April.  On 2 April, 
Wilson addressed Congress; between 2 April and 6 April, the House and Senate voted to approve 
Wilson‟s war declaration.26 
                                               
25 Millis, Road to War, 403-408. 
26 Notter, Origins of Foreign Policy, 633-636, 640-651. 
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CHAPTER 3 
WORLD WAR II 
 
World War II officially began in 1939; however, events in 1931 created new hostilities 
around the world.  As aggression increased, the chain of events that would bring the United 
States into the Second World War began.  In the 1930s, the nations of Germany, Japan, and Italy 
had installed militaristic or totalitarian governments and adopted policies of aggression.  For 
Americans and the safety of the United States, the greater danger was posed by Germany and 
Japan.  German and Japanese actions would prompt American intervention in World War II. 
 
Early Steps to War 
In 1931, Japan invaded Manchuria to expand its empire into China; however, the Great 
Depression forced Japan to stall this policy.  The invasion of Manchuria created international 
outrage that encouraged Japan to withdraw from the League of Nations.  In 1937, Japan resumed 
its expansionism by extending its aggression to China initiating the Sino-Japanese War.  Japan 
called its plan to expand in Asia the “Greater East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere,” although it was 
designed to eliminate Japanese dependence on imported goods.
27
 
 
War Begins 
In 1938, Germany began its territorial expansionist policies.  In March 1938, Adolf 
Hitler, Fürher of Germany, annexed Austria into Germany.  On 22 September, he demanded the 
transfer of the Sudetenland from Czechoslovakia.  The Sudetenland crisis was averted by the 
                                               
27 David Reynolds, From Munich to Pearl Harbor:  Roosevelt’s America and the Origins of the Second 
World War (Chicago:  Ivan R. Dee, 2001), 14-15. 
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Munich Conference between Britain, France, and Germany.  The Munich Agreement gave Hitler 
the Sudetenland and established the policy of appeasement, but it prevented him from gaining a 
military victory.
28
  Hitler‟s demand for the Sudetenland encouraged Roosevelt to propose a new 
budget with $1.3 billion allocated for national defense.  FDR defended the extra expenditures on 
fears a war was coming to Europe and might endanger the US.  One year later FDR‟s warnings 
came true. 
During the early stages of the war in Europe, Secretary of State Cordell Hull conducted 
Japanese-American diplomacy.  Hull‟s control over the diplomatic talks was second only to 
FDR‟s, who repeatedly denounced Japanese actions as atrocities.  In response to Japanese 
aggression in China, FDR decided to abrogate the 1911 Commercial Treaty between the US and 
Japan.  From 1937 to 1939, Japan fought with the Soviet Union over the Soviet-Manchurian 
border.  Following the invasion of Mongolia, Japan attempted to enter into an alliance with 
Germany.  However, on 23 August 1939, Germany signed the Nazi-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact 
with the Soviet Union.
29
  Articles II and IV of the Non-Aggression Pact were responsible for 
terminating Japanese plans with Germany.  Article II stated that the signing parties would not 
lend their support to a third power if a third power attacked one of them.  Article IV stated that 
neither signing nation would participate in an alliance aimed at the other signing nation.  The 
signing of the Non-Aggression Pact forced Japan to halt its expansionist plans until 1940.
30
 
On 1 September 1939, Germany invaded Poland beginning World War II in Europe.  
Germany quickly conquered Poland using a military technique of rapidly moving mechanized 
                                               
28 Reynolds, From Munich to Pearl Harbor, 39-40. 
29
 Reynolds, From Munich to Pearl Harbor, 41, 58-62. 
30 Joachim Remak, The Origins of the Second World War (Englewood Cliffs:  Prentice-Hall Inc., 1976) 
111-112. 
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divisions and aerial bombardments known as the blitzkrieg.  On 3 September, FDR publically 
declared America a neutral nation in the conflict.  By the end of 1939, the war had forced 
Congress to redraft American neutrality legislation; on 4 November, Congress passed the 
Neutrality Act of 1939.  The Neutrality Act of 1939 maintained most of the stipulations from the 
previous Neutrality Acts but forced belligerents to provide cash payments and transportation for 
shipments and prohibited the arming of merchant ships.
 31
  The first Neutrality Act signed in 
1935 prohibited export trade with belligerents, granting loans to belligerents, and travel of 
Americans on belligerent ships.
32
  The Neutrality Act in 1937 continued the prohibition from the 
1935 Act and added an impartial arms embargo.
33
  Following the passage of the new neutrality 
law, Congress approved additional defense spending and the Selective Service Act.
34
 
Following Germany‟s victory over Poland, there was a lull in aggression as neither the 
Allies nor Germany engaged in direct military action against each other.  This period between 
the autumn of 1939 and the spring of 1940 was called the phony war in the US.  During this 
time, Britain and France prepared for war while conducting peace negotiations with Germany.  
Beginning in April 1940, German resumed its offensive by quickly conquering Denmark and 
Norway.
35
   
                                               
31 U.S. Department of State, “Neutrality Act of 1939,” Peace and War:  United States Foreign Policy, 
1931-1941 (Washington, D.C.:  U.S. Government Printing Office, 1943) 494-505. 
32 U.S., Department of State, “Neutrality Act of August 31, 1935,” Peace and War: United States Foreign 
Policy, 1931-1941 (Washington, D.C.: U.S., Government Printing Office, 1943) 265-271 
33 U.S., Department of State, “Neutrality Act of May 1, 1937,” Peace and War: United States Foreign 
Policy, 1931-1941 (Washington, D.C.: U.S., Government Printing Office, 1943) 355-365. 
34 Robert A. Divine, The Reluctant Belligerent:  American Entry into World War II (Huntington:  Robert E. 
Krieger Publishing Company, 1976) 67-68. 
35 Reynolds, From Munich to Pearl Harbor, 56, 69, 71. 
22 
 
Beginning of American Aid 
In May 1940, Germany defeated France; on 21 June, France signed an armistice with the 
German government and installed the Vichy government.  The French defeat left Britain alone to 
fight Germany in Europe.  It also encouraged FDR to increase the volume of supplies sent to 
support the British war effort.
36
  During the summer and fall of 1940, FDR achieved numerous 
gains that granted him greater opportunities to aid the Allies.  On 2 July, Congress passed the 
National Defense Act authorizing FDR to limit or forbid exports of military equipment, 
armaments, or other materials necessary for military equipment by proclamation.
37
  FDR also 
ordered the US Navy to increase its size to create a two-ocean naval fleet.
38
  On 9 December, 
British Prime Minister Winston Churchill sent FDR a note detailing the worsening war 
conditions in Britain and its desperate need for American supplies.  On 17 December, FDR 
responded by publically revealing his Lend-Lease plan to supply Britain.  On 18 January 1941, 
Lend-Lease went to Congress for approval, but it was not approved until 11 March.
39
 
In addition to supplying British war needs, in January 1941, British military advisers 
arrived in Washington, DC seeking American cooperation to ensure the delivery of supplies to 
Britain.  These advisers came from the British Ministry of War.  While in Washington, they 
worked with Admiral Harold Stark and Army Chief of Staff General George Marshall to develop 
a plan for British and American joint operations.  These officials created a report titled ABC-1 
that became the blueprint for British-American actions for the war.  In the report, the US and 
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Britain agreed that they would defeat Germany first and Japan second.  The report detailed the 
defensive nature of the war in the Pacific until Germany‟s defeat.  In spite of some differences of 
opinion, the two sides agreed that the majority of the US Pacific Fleet would remain at Pearl 
Harbor while some ships went to support the Atlantic Fleet and Singapore.
40
 
 
Japan and the Greater East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere 
German victories in Europe encouraged Japan to expand its aggression into Southeast 
Asia as well.  In response to resumed Japanese aggression, FDR ordered the Pacific Fleet to 
conduct maneuvers off the Hawaiian Islands.  In May1940, FDR extended these orders, 
indefinitely stationing the fleet at Pearl Harbor, Hawaii in an attempt to thwart further Japanese 
aggression in Southeast Asia.  However, by the end of April 1940, FDR and his administration 
agreed that while Japan needed to be constrained in Southeast Asia, Germany posed the greater 
threat to American security.
41
 
In October 1940, Japan demanded the Vichy French government grant Japan access to 
French Indochina.  Japan also demanded the British government cease providing aid to China in 
the Sino-Japanese War.  On 27 September, Japan signed the Tripartite Pact with Germany and 
Italy.  The main reason behind Japan and Germany signing the pact was to dissuade the US from 
acting against them.  The Tripartite Pact provided this by stating the signing nations would unite 
if they were attacked by a nation not currently involved in the present war.
42
  On 16 October, the 
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Roosevelt administration ordered an embargo of scrap metal against Japan under the National 
Defense Act.   
In January 1941, Japan sent Admiral Kichisaburo Nomura to take over the position of 
Japanese Ambassador to the US.  Nomura was sent to improve Japanese-American relations 
through diplomatic talks.  On 14 February, Nomura was officially received by FDR, at which 
time FDR informed Nomura to meet with Hull to discuss the issues dividing Japan and the US.  
Unfortunately, these meetings would prove incapable of preventing America‟s intervention in 
December. 
 
Breakdown of Japanese-American Relations 
In April, Japanese-American negotiations stalled mainly due to a Japanese note sent to 
the US.  The Japanese note requested that the US cease aiding China and persuade Chiang Kai 
Shek to accept Japanese terms for peace; Japan in return offered to honor the Tripartite Pact only 
if the US attacked Germany.  Hull received the note and rejected it; he then sent Japan a note that 
requested Japanese acceptance of American principles in Southeast Asia, which was rejected by 
Japan.  Following these attempts at negotiation, Hull recognized that a successful settlement with 
Japan was impossible.  Still, this did not stop Hull from continuing negotiations with Japan.
43
 
As Japanese-American talks stalled, the Japanese government decided to take steps to 
further its conquest in Southeast Asia.  Japan decided to take French Indochina as a precondition 
for invasions of Malaya and the Dutch East Indies.  In preparation, Japan signed a Non-
Aggression Treaty with the Soviet Union in mid-April 1941.  Unfortunately, Germany disrupted 
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this plan two months later by invading Russia.
44
  The German invasion of Russia only allowed 
Japan two policy choices:  continue expansionist policies in Southeast Asia to counter American 
economic sanctions or invade Siberia and force the Soviet Union to fight a two front war.  Japan 
chose to expand into Southeast Asia, by demanding the Vichy French government grant it 
permission to use French Indochina as a staging area for its troops.
45
 
In July, Japanese actions and covert polices increased the Roosevelt administration‟s 
desire to force Japan‟s acquiescence to US demands.  On 23 July, Hull stopped negotiations with 
Japan after he was informed that Japan had demanded the right to build bases in southern French 
Indochina from the Vichy government.  In February 1941, the Treasury Department was 
informed that Japan had a secret cache of gold and American dollars.  In response, Secretary of 
the Treasury Henry Morgenthau, Jr. began prodding FDR to freeze Japanese assets.  In July, 
FDR decided to expand American economic sanctions against Japan.  On 26 July, FDR ordered 
all Japanese assets in the US frozen, thus completing his policy of economic sanctions against 
Japan.  FDR‟s orders establishing an oil embargo against Japan is discussed below.46 
 
Beginning of the Anglo-American Alliance 
In the summer of 1940, Hitler ordered the German Navy to begin submarine warfare after 
the Battle of Britain failed.  These orders forced FDR and his administration to reconsider 
escorting convoys to Britain even though escorts were prohibited in the 1939 Neutrality Act.  
FDR overcame this legal barrier by extending the Western Hemisphere Neutrality Patrol instead 
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of obtaining Congressional authorization to begin escorts.
47
  On 11 June 1941, the American ship 
Robin Moor was sunk by a German submarine.  FDR retaliated by issuing an executive order 
freezing all German assets in the US.  This was followed by closing the German consulates in the 
US on 16 June, though the Ambassador Bernstorff remained in Washington.
48
 
On 2 August, Churchill and FDR met off the coast of Newfoundland and held the 
Atlantic Conference.  During the Atlantic Conference, the two leaders created the Atlantic 
Charter to address the dangers posed by Germany and Japan.  During the conference, FDR made 
promises to Churchill; one of which was that he would order American naval vessels to begin 
escorting convoys to Britain after the conference.  It was not until September that FDR was able 
to fulfill this promise when German submarine attacks provided FDR with the reason to issue an 
order for the active defense of the US.  On 9 October, Congress abolished portions of the 1939 
Neutrality Act that prohibited escorts.
49
 
 
The War Takes a Turn 
On 22 June, Hitler broke the Nazi-Soviet Pact and invaded Russia.  Codenamed 
Operation Barbarossa, Germany quickly overtook Russian forces, providing Britain with a lull in 
warfare.  This was important since Hitler was determined to defeat the Soviet Union before the 
winter began.  The German invasion of Russia also encouraged FDR to offer the Soviet Union 
supplies under Lend-Lease to impede the German advance and provide Britain more time.  
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Nevertheless, many in Washington and London did not believe the Soviet Union would survive 
more than six months of warfare with Germany.
50
 
On 2 July, Japan occupied French Indochina to gain access to oil and raw materials, this 
led to the American oil embargo and freeze of Japanese assets.  In August after the Atlantic 
Conference, Japan attempted to get FDR to hold a meeting with the Japanese Premier Konoye.  
This proposal was rejected by the State Department.  In September, the Japanese government 
presented its final offers to gain a settlement with the US.  Japan offered to end all its activities in 
Southeast Asia, evacuate French Indochina, and guarantee the Philippines neutrality after the 
Sino-Japanese war ended if the US would cease aiding China, restore trade with Japan, and not 
install bases in China, Thailand, and the Dutch East Indies.  Hull rejected the Japanese offer.
51
  
In October, Hull presented Japan with an ultimatum to accept American terms.  On 16 October, 
Japan decided to begin military preparations for war but decided to postpone any action until 30 
November to provide time for negotiations to succeed.
52
 
 
Japan Forces American Intervention 
Confidences in the Roosevelt administration and Britain were high around 25 November 
that Japan would attack soon in Southeast Asia.  From November to 6 December, Japanese-
American negotiations slowly failed.  On 6 December, FDR attempted a final settlement by 
appealing to the Japanese Emperor Hirohito.  However, Japan had already decided to sever 
relations with America and sent Nomura a message from the Japanese government.  This letter 
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charged the US with collusion with Britain to prevent Japan‟s expansion and officially severed 
diplomatic relations.  Nomura was instructed to deliver the message at 1 pm on December 7, but 
due to a delay, the note was not delivered until after Japan had attacked Pearl Harbor.
53
 
On 8 December 1941, Roosevelt addressed Congress and declared that the Japanese 
attack on Pearl Harbor had initiated a state of war between Japan and the US.  He described 
American attempts to create peace between the two nations and Japan‟s break with negotiations 
after the attack had already started.  He noted the preparations the Japanese had made for the 
attack and that the attack was premeditated.  FDR also announced that he had ordered all 
measures taken to ensure American defense.  He then stated that “No matter how long it may 
take us to overcome this premeditated invasion the American people in their righteous might will 
win through absolute victory.…With confidence in our armed forces—with unbounding 
determination of our people—we will gain the inevitable triumph.”54   
He concluded by asking Congress to declare war with Japan.  When Roosevelt finished 
his address, Congress immediately voted to declare war and by 4:10 pm on 8 December, 
Roosevelt had signed the declaration.
55
  The 8 December declaration did not include Germany 
and Italy.  Those declarations were passed on 11 December 1941 after the remaining members of 
the Axis Powers declared war on the United States. 
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CHAPTER 4 
WOODROW WILSON‟S WAR POLICIES 
 
In August 1914, Woodrow Wilson faced maintaining peace for the US while the 
European nations fought a war.  From August 1914 to April 1917, Wilson presented himself as a 
neutral mediator to the Central Powers:  Germany and Austria-Hungary, and the Entente Powers:  
Britain, France, and Russia.  At the beginning of the Great War in Europe, Wilson decided to 
maintain strict neutrality in the United States.  He also tried to protect US neutral rights in trade 
and access to the seas.  However, Britain‟s naval blockade and Germany‟s retaliatory submarine 
campaign made this impossible.  In addition, Wilson‟s desires to use the US as the world‟s moral 
compass were incompatible with the Central and Entente Powers‟ determination to achieve an 
absolute victory as a guarantor for peace.  Wilson‟s foreign policy was designed to protect 
American neutrality and establish the US as a mediator to negotiate an end to the First World 
War.   
 
Foundations of Woodrow Wilson‟s Foreign Policy 
Wilson‟s foreign policy from 1914-1917 was based on utopian, progressive, and 
moralistic ideologies.  Wilson tried to use these ideologies as a foundation for policies that would 
encourage the European powers to accept a peaceful settlement.  When the war began in August 
1914, Wilson‟s concept of neutrality was so severe that in 1916 he refused a rose cutting from 
Verdun to avoid appearing biased.  In spite of his good intentions, Wilson was not a good 
30 
 
diplomat:  he was greatly hindered by his inability to judge foreign or international events 
properly.
56
  
From the beginning of WWI, Wilson believed that America had a unique moral 
obligation to all of humanity because Americans were linked to all of humanity through blood.  
He believed America‟s greatest achievement was peace for humanity.  He also believed that 
America‟s destiny included service to humanity, justice, and to set an example for the world.  In 
light of these responsibilities, Wilson viewed America‟s neutrality as a duty.  In addition to these 
lofty goals, one of Wilson‟s central objectives was the creation of a righteous peace.  To achieve 
this peace, Wilson needed the US to remain neutral.  This objective was also the reasoning 
behind his disinclination to protest Germany‟s invasion of Belgium in 1914, because he believed 
neutrality was necessary for his acceptance as a neutral mediator.
57
 
As Wilson conducted his foreign policy, it became obvious that he was an idealist, he 
was personally offended by the war, and was “singularly lacking in appreciation of the European 
crisis.”58  Wilson‟s idealism and his practical nature made him a danger when conducting foreign 
policy.  To offset this obstacle, Wilson desperately needed an advisor, like Colonel E.M. House, 
who was acquainted with European political leaders‟ current practices and aims.  However, 
Wilson often rejected advice that contradicted with his own opinions and due to this House was 
unable to perform this duty.  House only remained Wilson‟s advisor through flattery and 
pretense; he was never able to get Wilson to understand European views fully.
59
 
                                               
56 Harvey A. DeWeerd, President Wilson Fights His War, World War I and the American Intervention 
(New York:  The Macmillan Company, 1968) 5, 7-8. 
57 Notter, Origins of Foreign Policy, 324-325. 
58 DeWeerd, President Wilson, 8. 
59 DeWeerd, President Wilson, 8. 
31 
 
Founding America‟s Position for Peace 
When the war began, Wilson was encouraged by the US Ambassador to England Walter 
Hines Page and Franklin Knight Lane to extend “the good offices of the U.S. for peace.”60  From 
1914 to 1917, Wilson held the opinion that the European war was wrong and had to be stopped.  
During American neutrality, he believed the US mission was to prevent the destruction of 
Europe from a long war of attrition.  Wilson also believed that an absolute victory would 
instigate harsh terms and lay the foundation for a future war.
61
  In this mindset, he willingly 
accepted the advice from Page and Lane and extended the good offices of the US for peace 
negotiations.   
On 4 August 1914, Wilson extended to the belligerent leadership “under article three of 
that [Hague] convention to say to you in a spirit of most earnest friendship that I should welcome 
an opportunity to act in the interest of European peace”.62  Part of Wilson‟s desire to encourage 
European peace was his belief that European resources and manpower would be exhausted at a 
rate that would eventually force Europe to call upon the US for aid.  By 1917, Wilson‟s 
determination to end the war had been pushed to the point that he believed America would have 
to enter the war.  At this time, the deciding factor that forced American intervention was the 
German government‟s unrestricted submarine campaign.  During American neutrality, Wilson 
believed he had a special responsibility for establishing peace in Europe.
63
 
                                               
60 Woodrow Wilson, “From Walter Hines Page to Wilson,” May 6-September 5, 1914, vol. 30 of The 
Papers edited by Arthur S. Link, David W. Hirst, John E. Little, Edith James, and Sylvia Elvin (Princeton:  
Princeton University Press, 1979) 329-331. 
61 DeWeerd, President Wilson, 9. 
62 Wilson, “A Press Release,” May 6-Septembe 5, 1914, 342. 
63 DeWeerd, President Wilson, 9-10. 
32 
 
When WWI began on 1 August, Wilson described is at “this incredible European 
catastrophe.”  On 3 August, Wilson described it as “this dreadful European conflict.”  Wilson‟s 
attitude on America‟s responsibility to the world is best summed up by his statement to the 
newspapers on 3 August:  “I want to have the pride of feeling that America if nobody else has 
her self-possession and stands ready with calmness of thought and steadiness of purpose to help 
the rest of the world.”64  In the early period of WWI, Wilson refused to pass judgment on the 
war.  This caused uncertainty in Wilson‟s attitudes on the justice of the Entente‟s cause; 
therefore, Wilson asked the American people not to judge European events thus initiating his 
policy of neutrality.
65
  However, some parts of the American public had already judged the war‟s 
events and taken sides.  In addition, being an Anglophile and passionate admirer of English 
culture and its political system, Wilson was intensely biased towards the British. 
 
Defending American Neutral Rights 
On 4 August, Wilson proclaimed American neutrality.  He also used this time to acquire 
an agreement from the Central Powers and Entente Powers to respect American neutral rights on 
trade and access to the seas.  Wilson based this protection on the 1909 Declaration of London.  
The Declaration of London was the only summarizing statement of neutral rights and dictated 
peaceful trade during a war.  It also defined the relationship between the Central Powers and 
Entente, and the relationship between belligerents and neutrals.  However, the Declaration of 
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London was never ratified because America and England refused to sign it.  During the latter 
part of 1914, Wilson tried to get the belligerents to accept the Declaration of London.
66
 
Gaining acceptance of the Declaration was the first objective of Wilson‟s foreign policy.  
Wilson was under pressure from domestic businesses to continue export of US raw materials and 
goods as well as to secure the right of American ships to travel wherever they wanted 
uninterrupted.  He viewed the Declaration of London as the best way to lessen these pressures.  
This policy was hindered by Britain‟s determination to use its naval fleet to blockade the Central 
Powers.  On 16 August, Wilson began his attempts to gain unanimous acceptance of the 
Declaration from the belligerents.  Eventually, Wilson realized the British were unwilling to 
limit their blockade, yet he was unwilling to allow the British to continue seizing US ships 
without protest.  Wilson was able to get the Central Powers to agree to the Declaration, but the 
Entente placed their acceptance on the decision of the British government.
67
   
The British responded to the Declaration of London with the Order in Council.  The 
Order in Council removed and altered parts of the Declaration of London—including the 
conditional and absolute contraband list—it allowed the British to alter the list as needed and 
allowed Britain to use the continuous voyage policy.
68
  On 9 October, US Ambassador to Britain 
Walter Hines Page, British Foreign Minister Sir Edward Grey, and British Ambassador to the US 
Cecil Spring Rice sent Wilson a note in an attempt to persuade Wilson to accept Britain‟s Order 
in Council.  Yet, Wilson continued to refuse to accept the Order in Council as a replacement for 
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the Declaration of London.  On 21 October, Wilson withdrew his suggestion for the belligerents 
to adopt the Declaration of London and accepted the British blockade.
69
 
During the Declaration negotiations, the main problem was the British attempt to change 
articles in the Declaration that affected neutral trade.  In a note to London, Secretary of State 
William Jennings Bryan noted that the British conditions would “arouse a spirit of resentment 
among the American people toward Great Britain, which this government would extremely 
regret but which it would be unable to prevent.”  The note also stated that Wilson did not want to 
issue a formal protest against British acceptance of the Order in Council.
70
  Even after informing 
the British government that the Central Powers had conditionally accepted the Declaration of 
London, Anglo-American negotiations were unable to gain an accord on the Declaration of 
London with or without the Order in Council by October 21, 1914.
71
 
 
American Economic Policy 
As Wilson‟s negotiations on the Declaration of London were deteriorating, his 
administration had to determine the neutrality of allowing belligerents to gain loans from US 
banks.  On 10 August, Bryan informed Wilson that J.P. Morgan and Company had asked if the 
US government objected to American banks issuing loans to the belligerents.  Bryan proposed 
three reasons loans were objectionable: 
First:  Money is the worst of all contrabands because it commands everything 
else…Second…a loan would be taken by those in sympathy with the country in whose 
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behalf the loan was negotiated…Third:  the powerful financial interests which would be 
connected with these loans would be tempted to use their influence through the 
newspapers to support the interests of the Government to which they had loaned because 
the value of the security would be directly affected by the result of war.
72
 
On 16 August, the Wilson administration‟s opinion was expressed to Sir Edward Grey: 
There is no reason why loans should not be made to the neutral Governments, but in the 
judgment of this Government, loans by American bankers to any foreign nation who is at 
war is inconsistent with the true spirit of neutrality…This decision is stated to represent 
absolutely the harmonious views of the President and Mr. Bryan…The administration 
believes that the position thus adopted by them will indirectly curtail the duration of the 
war.
73
 
In spite of this declaration the British blockade and American neutral trade continued. 
 
The British blockade allowed the Entente Powers to gain a monopoly on American 
exports, thus causing the US to become an Entente supply base.  In spite of the Entente supply 
status, Wilson refused to allow the governments to gain loans and Bryan was successful in 
advising Wilson that allowing American banks to grant loans to belligerents was contrary to U.S. 
neutral policy.
74
  Although Wilson originally disagreed with providing loans, he accepted the 
war business—even if it was only with the Entente powers—because it created full employment 
and prosperity.  From this time on, Bryan clearly recognized the danger of a neutral power 
becoming financially committed to one side of a war.
75
 
As Entente purchases increased, Wilson attempted to enlarge his neutral policy by 
allowing American banks to provide loans to the belligerents.  In an attempt to allow the loans 
legally, Counselor to the State Department Robert Lansing suggested the use of “credit” loans 
                                               
72 Wilson, “From William Jennings Bryan to Wilson,” May 6-September 5, 1914, 372-373. 
73 Wilson, “Colville Barclay to Sir Edward Grey” May 6-September 5, 1914, 386. 
74 Notter, Origins of Foreign Policy, 323. 
75 DeWeerd, President Wilson, 12-13 
36 
 
over “general” loans because “credit” loans were not a “public issue.”  In spite of this, Wilson 
continued to recognize that loans created unneutral feelings and that to allow the loans he would 
have to retract his moral policy.  Wilson used the information provided to prove the inability of 
the Executive to prevent credit loans legally, because they were considered commercial debt 
instead of money loans.  Wilson continued to believe that loans were unneutral and that the new 
policy kept the government‟s loan policy intact.  Wilson regarded this as a minor episode and 
believed that he was still in control of unneutral influences in America.  He also saw American 
trade as a right under international law, and he preferred to enlarge American influence through 
American trade.
76
 
Wilson‟s method that allowed the Entente powers to gain loans from American banks 
was deceitful.  Wilson informed Lansing of his opinion that “we should say that parties [the 
American Government] would take no action either for or against such a transaction but that this 
should be orally conveyed… and not put in writing”.77  On 15 October, the Wilson 
administration announced that American banks could make loans to the belligerents.  Even 
though it had stopped banks earlier, it had simply used moral dissuasion because the Executive 
did not have the power to stop them.  The Wilson administration also announced that Americans 
could sell contraband and conditional contraband to the belligerents “without violating the 
neutrality of the United States.”78  Wilson based his decision to allow the belligerents American 
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loans on The Hague Convention of 1907 and American precedence set in the Russo-Japanese 
War.
79
   
On 23 October, Lansing released a memorandum that detailed Wilson‟s description of the 
difference between loans and government bonds.  Wilson stated that government bonds, which 
were based on American gold, directly financed the war while “The acceptance of Treasury 
notes or other evidence of debt in payment for articles purchased in this country is merely a 
means of facilitating trade by a system of credits which will avoid the clumsy and impractical 
method of cash payments.”80  Numerous actions during October 1914 demonstrated that America 
was no longer strictly neutral, especially as a few unneutral individuals were becoming 
publically vocal of their thoughts and sympathies.
81
 
 
Wilson‟s Response to Submarine Warfare 
As Wilson was clearing the way for loans to the belligerents, Germany‟s submarine 
campaign was beginning to draw attention.  At this time, Wilson expressed no apprehension of 
the campaign in spite of Entente warnings.  In addition, the submarine campaign posed a greater 
danger to warships and cruisers, the only danger merchant ships faced were from mines deployed 
in the North Sea.
82
  This situation placed Wilson‟s foreign policy between Britain‟s blockade and 
Germany‟s submarine campaign.  Wilson believed the solution to this problem was for Britain to 
end its blockade and Germany to end its submarine campaign.  However, neither side was 
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willing to abandon a successful naval weapon when their armies were deadlocked in Europe.  
Wilson raised this issue several times, all ended in failure.  Eventually Wilson would come to 
hold Germany culpable for the war because its campaign killed people, while Britain only seized 
ships and cargo.
83
 
In February, the German submarine campaign changed as the German government issued 
a statement warning that commercial ships sailing to Britain or Ireland did so at the risk of 
sinking.  On 10 February, Wilson issued a warning to the German government.  It stated that the 
US government vowed to hold Germany, “to a strict accountability for such actions [sinking of 
American ships] of their naval authorities, and to take any steps it might be necessary to take to 
safeguard American lives and property and to secure to American citizens the full enjoyment of 
their acknowledged rights on the high seas.”84 
 
Overtures of Peace 
Wilson wanted to spread a peace agenda based on his belief that war never permanently 
settled any issues, and that to ensure permanent peace war would have to be eradicated in the 
future.  He believed that understanding, enlightenment, and moral responsibility were needed to 
advance peace.  Wilson felt that peace was founded on a balance of just national forces by 
eliminating domestic exploitation and had formulated his war policy by mid-August.  This policy 
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consisted of establishing a mediated peace between the belligerents and maintaining American 
neutrality so he could become a mediator.
85
 
On 19 September 1914, Bryan sent Wilson a note urging Wilson to assume the initiative 
for peace because the Entente and Central Powers believed that peace could only be achieved 
through a military victory.  Bryan also suggested terms to ensure future peace that included 
getting the belligerents to agree to a government monopoly on munitions manufacturing, 
reducing military forces, and respecting territorial boundaries as initial steps for peace.  Bryan 
wrote 
I believe that a compulsory investigation of disputes before hostilities begin, such as our 
[Bryan] treaties provide for, would go far toward preventing war, but the most potent of 
all influences for the promotion of peace is the substitution of friendship for hatred, and 
your plan of taking away the pecuniary interest which private corporations now have in 
war, mill make it easier to cultivate friendship.
86
 
Wilson was also urged to publically appeal to the belligerents to conduct peace 
negotiations before an armistice was agreed to.
87
  Bryan presented two reasons for peace 
mediations.  First, all the belligerents denied responsibility for war and desired peace.  Second, 
responsibility for continuing the war was the same as starting it, and in this way responsibility 
also belonged to the US if the US could assist in creating a peaceful settlement and did nothing.  
Bryan encouraged Wilson to earnestly appeal to the belligerents and to remind them that an 
armistice was not essential to mediation.
88
  Unfortunately, Wilson did not undertake it upon 
himself to conduct policy based on this advice until late 1916 when it was too late.  Wilson only 
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turned to this policy because secret negotiations had failed and he was desperate to find an 
avenue that would create a mediated peace.
89
 
During WWI, Wilson repeatedly protested British amendments to the list of absolute and 
conditional contraband.  These protests focused on satisfying public resentment toward the 
British blockade rather than addressing the illegality of the British changes and creating an 
acceptable list.  Wilson designed the protests to state the US opinion and still maintain friendly 
relations between the US and Britain.  His decision to avoid a break in relations with Britain was 
based on Wilson‟s understanding of the influences that led the US into the War of 1812.  Wilson 
believed the US entered the War of 1812 because of the harm inflicted on American trade from 
the British blockade.  He also believed he needed cooperation with Britain to achieve his peace 
policy.
90
 
 
German Grievances Against the United States 
As early as November 1914, Wilson and his administration were becoming aware of 
growing German-American hostility to the administration‟s policy of neutrality, in particular its 
policy that allowed the sale of war munitions to the Allies.  German-American hostility was most 
clearly described in a letter to Wilson from Professor Hugo Münsterberg of Harvard University.  
Professor Münsterberg‟s letter arrived after the 1914 mid-term elections.91  In the seven-page 
letter, Münsterberg described the hostility of German sympathizers to the Wilson 
administration‟s neutrality policy.  In particular, German-Americans were alienated by the 
administration‟s willingness to allow wireless news to be censored, the detaining of German and 
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Austria-Hungarian ships, and the permitted violation of the Hague Convention on conditional 
and absolute contraband.  Münsterberg noted that German-Americans resented these issues the 
most. 
Münsterberg also described additional grievances over the administration‟s willingness to 
allow Britain to interfere with American harbors and American ships, the unlimited sale of 
munitions to the Entente Powers, and granting American loans to the Allies.  Münsterberg noted 
that, “The friends of peace had firmly hoped the President would denounce the sale of 
ammunition or any other sale which would be likely to prolong the war.”  In addition, he also 
called attention US acceptance of British interception of mail from Dutch ships even though it 
contradicted international laws.  Münsterberg also wrote that, “The friends of Germany cannot 
forget this sympathetic attitude of the State Department under the conditions which objectively 
exist is not only helpful to het prolongation of the war, but helpful exclusively to the Allies 
against Central Europe.”92 
On 1 December, Wilson forwarded Münsterberg‟s letter to Robert Lansing for a 
memorandum with answers and comments to address the hostility the administration was facing 
from German-Americans and German sympathizers.
93
  On 9 December, Lansing sent Wilson an 
eleven-page memorandum on Münsterberg‟s letter.  In the memorandum, Lansing denounced 
Münsterberg‟s letter for distorting the truth, making false allegations of injustice to Germany, 
and “undue friendliness” to the Allies.  Lansing wrote that Münsterberg‟s letter was part of a 
“campaign of misrepresentation and vilification.”94  American claims were aided by the German 
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government‟s admittance that belligerents had the right to buy munitions from the US.95  This 
reinforced Bryan‟s 26 December suggestion to Wilson that he publically announce that “the right 
of belligerents to purchase arms and ammunitions in neutral countries is so well settled that we 
have had no protest or complaint from an belligerent as to purchases made by any other 
belligerent in the United States.”96 
 
Moves Towards a Munitions Embargo 
However, these steps by the Wilson administration did not silence the opposition to the 
continued sale of munitions to the belligerents.  By January 1915, anti-British hostility had 
forced Congress to begin debating an embargo of war munitions.  This hostility only increased to 
the point that Senator Stone Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee reported the change 
of unneutrality to Bryan for an explanation.
97
  On 6 January, Bryan informed Wilson that the 
House Foreign Affairs committee was hearing arguments for the passage of Representative 
Bartholdt‟s resolution for an arms embargo in the US.  Bryan also informed inquiring 
Representatives that initiating an arms embargo was unneutral because it was designed to assist 
one party over another.
98
  This response only further increased anti-British resentment and 
resentment with American neutrality policy.  While this was happening, Britain and other pro-
Allied forces were disturbed.  American export of munitions placed Wilson in a conundrum, and 
                                               
95 Wilson, “From William Jennings Bryan to Wilson,” September 6 – December 31, 1914, 521-522. 
96 Wilson, “From William Jennings Bryan to Wilson,” September 6 – December 31, 1914, 533. 
97 Link, Struggle for Neutrality, 161-163. 
98 Wilson, “From William Jennings Bryan to Wilson,” January 1-April 16, 1915, 24. 
43 
 
it took him three weeks to make his decision and even then, he was not firm on his moral 
grounding.  Eventually, Wilson decided to allow the export in munitions to continue.   
In an attempt to defuse anti-British and anti-administration feelings, Wilson announced 
that the President did not have the authority to place an embargo on munitions to belligerent.  
Unfortunately, this did not stop German-American protests against the Wilson administration.
99
  
In October 1914, Wilson attempted his first of several efforts to get the Central and Entente 
Powers to accept a mediated peace.  Wilson extended the offer on the belief that the powers 
would use reason as a determining factor in their decision.  Unfortunately, the Entente and 
Central Powers were unwilling to use reason to determine their actions.
100
  Throughout the war, 
Wilson was unable to get the belligerents to accept peace mediation to end the war. 
 
Wilson and Preparedness 
In November 1914, Wilson was beginning to grow concerned over the possibility that his 
foreign policy would not succeed in Europe.  He began to consider military preparedness though 
he continued to reject the need for preparations.  When Wilson was presented with a plan for 
military preparedness, he informed House that such a plan would shock Americans, and more 
importantly would not be needed.  Wilson argued that even if Germany won WWI, there would 
be enough time for America to prepare because Germany would be exhausted from the war and 
would be in no position to threaten the US.
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By January 1915, Wilson began to receive criticism for his anti-preparedness stance and 
his neutral policy.  On January 22, Wilson and Bryan received accusations from Britain of 
having pro-German sympathies.
102
  Wilson and Bryan replied by noting that pro-German 
sympathies existed in America mostly with German and Irish-Americans.  They described the 
influence and representation of German and Irish-Americans in American life, yet they assured 
Britain that “there need by no fear that his [Senator Bartholdt] proposals will be adopted, but 
they are a sample of our difficulties.  Notwithstanding such influences the vast majority of the 
American people are genuinely friendly in the attitude towards Great Britain.”  In addition, 
Wilson and Bryan noted that British policies that hindered US trade weakened British support in 
America.  The note also presented the administration‟s position in other cases Britain has 
protested.
103
 
By March 1915, the majority of the trade and submarine controversies had developed.  
These controversies demonstrate the development of Wilson‟s foreign policy as a disagreement 
with Britain was solved without leading to a conflict between the US and Britain, while a dispute 
with the German government immediately led to a crisis between the US and Germany.  This 
dispute centered on the German government‟s refusal to abandon its submarine warfare and US 
unwillingness to protest Entente surveillance of neutral trade.
104
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The Wilson Administration and Submarine Warfare 
The first American death from Germany‟s u-boats was Leon C. Thrasher on April 1.  
Thrasher died when the British ship he was on, the Falaba, was sunk by a German torpedo.  This 
was Wilson‟s first dilemma from the German tactic; he did not want to retaliate because it was 
contrary to his peace policy.  This led to a debate to find a response that avoided retaliation, in 
which Wilson decided that he could not allow belligerents to use American lives to protect their 
ships.  He issued a protest to Germany against the immorality of Thrasher‟s death and illegality 
of sinking the Falaba without warning.  Wilson‟s decision to use moral and legal arguments 
against German actions placed him in an inflexible course that directed his policy with Germany 
for the war.
105
 
From 6 April to 8 April, Bryan and Wilson debated the use of a balanced neutral policy 
when dealing with Britain and Germany.  Bryan recognized some justification for the German 
government‟s actions; however, he did not extend that justification to taking lives.  Bryan argued 
that American citizens should avoid areas that were known to be dangerous.  However, Lansing, 
the State Department, and the Navy disagreed; they argued that Germany should not be allowed 
to deny Americans their neutral rights including use of the seas.  Bryan also suggested that 
Wilson publically appeal for peace in response to Germany‟s submarine campaign and Britain‟s 
starvation blockade.  Wilson replied that he was not confident that strong declarations should be 
made to Germany.  In addition, Wilson argued that a public appeal would be futile and seen as 
“offensive.”  He continued that, “We would lose such influence as we have for peace,” that 
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Germany had not spoken of peace conditions and that reason had not persuaded the belligerents 
into thinking of “the peace and prosperity of Europe but their own aggrandizement.”106 
Bryan wrote Wilson a note on 19 April, questioning the morality of allowing millions to 
starve over the morality of allowing a few people to drown over war policies.  He urged Wilson 
to defend American neutrality by forbidding the use of the American flag on ships and 
prohibiting Americans from sailing on belligerent ships.  Bryan suggested that Wilson persuade 
Germany and Britain to negotiate.  He suggested that in return for Britain allowing food into 
Germany, Germany would stop sinking merchant ships.  He repeats his urging that Wilson call 
the belligerents to a conference because he doubted that “secret proposals will suffice—a public 
appeal strongly worded might have effect.”107 
In a second note on April 23, Bryan warned against protesting German actions and not 
British actions on moral ground.  Bryan argued that those Americans who travelled on 
belligerent ships took the same risk as those Americans who lived in belligerent countries.  He 
also warned that the Thrasher note could cause a crisis with Germany.  Bryan once again urged 
Wilson that it is “this nation‟s right and duty to make not a secret but an open appeal for the 
acceptance of mediation.”108 
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On 1 May, the German Ambassador to the US Johann von Bernstorff issued a warning in 
the American press because he feared the “US government „underestimated the dangers of the 
situation‟.”109  Bernstorff‟s warning stated: 
Travelers intending to embark on the Atlantic voyage are reminded that a state of war 
exists between Germany and her allies and Great Britain and her allies; that the zone of 
war includes the waters adjacent to the British Isles; that in accordance with formal notice 
given by the Imperial German Government vessels flying the flag of Great Britain or any 
of her allies are liable to destruction in those waters and that travelers sailing in the war 
zone on ships of Great Britain or her allies do so at their own risk.
110
 
Lansing viewed the warning as an attempt by the German government to force a diplomatic 
break with the US, while Bryan thought the note was the German‟s attempt to avoid any 
additional issues between Germany and the US.  More importantly, Bryan thought that no 
American citizen would take the risk involved with traveling on a belligerent ship.
111
 
 
The Lusitania Changes Wilson and His Administration 
On 1 May, the Lusitania set sail from New York, on May 7, as it neared the Irish Coast 
the Lusitania was sunk by a German submarine.  The Lusitania sank within eighteen minutes 
with 1198 passengers dying of which 128 were American citizens.  The sinking of the Lusitania 
and the deaths of the 128 Americans on board was viewed as murder by most in the US.  For 
most of the American public, Germany could not mitigate or justify the deaths as part of its 
retaliatory campaign against the Allies.
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The rise in moral indignation at the loss of American lives on the Lusitania forced 
Wilson to try to find an avenue that would express America‟s moral outrage without risking US 
involvement in the war.  From 8 May to 10 May, Wilson pondered the best way to accomplish 
this without input from his advisors.  He was determined to find the proper course of action that 
would protest the deaths without threatening war.  Wilson recognized he had to respond to the 
submarine campaign and properly represent American desires, he had to “know and to do the 
things that the now and his nation needed.”113 
On 9 May, Wilson received letters from House and Bryan.  House‟s letter confirmed the 
loss of American lives and urged Wilson to send a demand to Germany.  He suggested that the 
demand include Germany grant assurances that events like the Lusitania would not be repeated 
and a warning that if Germany refused then the US government would take necessary measures 
to protect American citizens even if it meant war with Germany.  House also wrote: 
Our intervention will save rather than increase the loss of life.  America has come to the 
parting of the ways, when she must determine whether she stands for civilized or 
uncivilized warfare.  [I] Think we can no longer remain neutral spectators.  Our action in 
this crisis will determine the part we play when peace is made, and how far we may 
influence the settlement for the lasting good of humanity. 
On the other hand, Bryan‟s letter noted an editorial that supported Germany‟s warning on 
the first.  He also suggested that Wilson consider prohibiting ships that carry contraband from 
also carrying passengers, especially because Germany‟s campaign was designed to prevent its 
enemies from receiving contraband.  Bryan argued that, “a ship carrying contraband should not 
rely upon passengers to protect her from attack—it would be like putting women and children in 
front of an army.”114  To support his arguments, Bryan noted the Lusitania‟s cargo manifest 
                                               
113 Link, Struggle for Neutrality, 375, 380-381. 
114 Wilson, “From William Jennings Bryan to Wilson,” April 17-July 21, 1915, 135. 
49 
 
included cartridges and ammunition, which was used by the Germans in their defense of sinking 
the ship.
115
 
Wilson received Bryan‟s advice for warning Americans against traveling on belligerent 
ships, especially those carrying contraband.  However, Lansing rejected Bryan‟s suggestions and 
made his own which included a formal protest that Wilson accepted.
116
  On 10 May, Bryan 
forwarded to Wilson a note and memorandum prepared by Lansing in response to the sinking of 
the Lusitania.  Lansing‟s memorandum confirmed that the Lusitania carried contraband, but 
argued that if the German government was aware of this then they were also aware whether or 
not it had also been armed, which evidence had proven it had not been.  Lansing continued the 
German government could not argue knowledge on one hand and ignorance on the other.  He 
argued that, “If the German government had knowledge in one case, they are chargeable with 
knowledge in the second.”117  Lansing also pointed out that the German Embassy‟s warning did 
not absolve Germany of responsibility for illegal actions that caused the death of US citizens.  
He also argued that by sending the warning the American press instead of the US government the 
German embassy ignored the US government and denied it the ability to act on the warning.  
Lansing argued that because the State Department failed to receive the warning and had not 
advised Americans to heed it, Americans ignored the warning.
118
 
Lansing‟s 10 May note to Wilson suggested a strong reply to Germany‟s response to the 
Lusitania‟s sinking.  Lansing advised Wilson to demand that the German government disavow 
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the act and apologize, that the guilty officer be punished, the German government acknowledge 
liability, pay a just indemnity, and guarantee future measures would be taken to ensure the safety 
of American lives unless they were on an armed belligerent ship or convoyed by belligerent war 
craft.  Lansing further suggested that if Germany refused to accept American demands then the 
government should break diplomatic relations with Germany but not necessarily enter the war.  
In addition, Lansing wrote that the US government should reach out to the other neutrals to 
protest German and British international law violations.  He offered that the note to Germany 
should cover breeches in principles of humanity in addition to violations of international law, 
and that the British note should cover its illegal interception of neutral trade.
119
 
On 11 May, Wilson sent Bryan a copy of his response to Germany on the Lusitania case.  
In the note, Wilson adopted Lansing‟s proposals for the terms Germany needed to agree to in 
order to settle the Lusitania crisis.
120
  Wilson opened the letter by describing the problems 
inherent with Germany‟s submarine campaign in particular the inability of the u-boats to take 
ships to prize court and the need to guarantee the safety of the ship‟s crew and passengers.  
Wilson also noted that the US government did not believe the German government authorized its 
submarine commanders to endanger the lives of civilians.  Wilson then demanded the German 
government disavow the sinking of the Lusitania, make reparations for the deaths, and take steps 
to prevent a similar action in the future.  Wilson concluded by reaffirming American neutral 
rights and asked the German government to respond quickly.
121
  The Cabinet agreed to Wilson‟s 
note and that it should be sent immediately.  This was after the Cabinet was unable to agree to 
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the cost of breaking relations with Germany, warning Americans against travel on belligerent 
ships, and waiting for the end of WWI to settle the Lusitania case.
122
 
Following the Lusitania incident, Bryan repeated his suggestion that the US either 
equally acquiesce to British and German actions or equally protest British and German actions.  
While Wilson agreed, he was not completely willing to send Britain a strong note protesting its 
interference with American trade.  On 1 June, Wilson held a cabinet meeting where he and Bryan 
disagreed over sending a strong note to Britain, and Bryan accused the cabinet of pro-Allied 
sympathies.  On 2 June, Wilson began composing the second Lusitania note and turned to 
Lansing and Bryan for advice.  Lansing sent Wilson legal data, while Bryan tried once more to 
get Wilson to agree with his opinion.  After receiving the letters, Wilson used Lansing‟s data and 
his own opinions.  Upon receiving a copy of Wilson‟s second note and a personal note from 
Wilson describing his inability to support Bryan‟s ideas, Bryan accepted the fact that he needed 
to resign.  On 9 June, Bryan officially resigned as Secretary of State after clearly noting that 
Wilson was no longer acting in a neutral manner.
123
 
Bryan‟s resignation allowed Wilson‟s foreign policy to become discernibly pro-Allied, 
because Bryan represented the small restraining force against Wilson.  Bryan‟s resignation 
effectively allowed Wilson to become his own Secretary of State even though Robert Lansing 
officially became the Secretary of State.  Following Bryan‟s resignation Wilson also ignored 
Walter Hines Page, US Ambassador to England, and James W. Gerard US Ambassador to 
Germany.
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In addition to administrational difficulties created by Bryan‟s resignation Wilson‟s 
second Lusitania note increased diplomatic difficulties with Germany.  The German government 
realized with the second Lusitania note that Wilson refused to recognize their declared war zone.  
However, the tone of Wilson‟s note appealed to German morality and diplomatic friendship, and 
many in the German government recognized it and thought that attempts should be made to 
come to an understanding with the US.  Germany‟s willingness to come to an understanding with 
US was limited to maintaining some part of the submarine campaign.
125
 
Before Germany replied to the second Lusitania note, Wilson and his administration had 
begun to reflect the American public‟s suspicion of German activities and fear the German and 
Austro-Hungarian governments were supporting plots to encourage strikes in munitions plants.  
From June to August, American police and British officials discovered evidence of German 
activities for sabotage against the US and Wilson administration at home.  In August, additional 
documents were released by the Wilson administration that publicized German activities and 
propaganda in the US.  At this time, numerous arrests of German-Americans and German 
officials in the US added to American resentment against Germany.
126
 
On 8 July, Germany replied to the second Lusitania note.  The German reply only offered 
appeasement as it defended the German violation of Wilson‟s principles to retaliate against the 
British blockade.  It also offered to allow Americans to travel on neutral ships that were specially 
marked if the German government was given advanced notice.  Wilson noted that the note 
offered an improvement of u-boat conduct that persuaded Wilson that submarine warfare could 
be conducted legally.  Still, Wilson refused the German offer and argued that the issues between 
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Germany and Britain could only be considered separately.  In the third Lusitania note, the US 
settlement demands went beyond American neutral rights to include the rights of all neutral 
nations and preventing violations in the future.  The third note reiterated the US demand for 
Germany to disavow the u-boat commander‟s actions.127 
It was not until July 1915 that Wilson realized that he could not achieve a satisfactory 
settlement with Germany over its submarine attacks; although, he was able to get Germany to 
suspend its unrestricted submarine warfare.  This realization forced Wilson to begin considering 
preparedness plans for American defense.  These plans included an enlargement of the US Navy 
and Army.  Wilson‟s preparedness campaign became public when he asked for appointments 
with Congressional committees that would conduct the preparations.  In addition, a letter from 
Sir Edward Grey on 10 August suggested the formation of a “League of Nations” and American 
membership in the League.  Grey also linked US peace negotiations to a guarantee for future 
peace.  This pulled Wilson towards stronger pro-British sympathies especially as he received 
information that increased his unfriendliness to Germany.
128
 
From August to September, Wilson‟s determination to solve the German submarine 
problem came to a breaking point, as the Arabic was torpedoed causing additional American 
casualties.  Austria-Hungary took responsibility for the sinking, though the ship was sunk by a 
German u-boat flying the Austrian flag.  Towards the end of August, Wilson allowed Lansing to 
push Germany aggressively to settle the Lusitania case.  On 1 September, Germany acquiesced 
and ordered its submarine commanders not to sink passenger liners without warning and provide 
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for the safety of civilians if the ships did not flee or attack.  Wilson viewed these concessions as 
a success.
129
 
 
Belligerent Policies Force Wilson‟s Hand 
From September 1915 to May 1916, Wilson‟s foreign policy and neutral policy faced 
great difficulties.  Wilson was increasingly forced to meet the belligerents on their terms and as a 
result, he abandoned his pacifist policy for military preparedness.  He continued to face issues 
from Germany‟s submarine campaign that severely tested his will to keep the US out of WWI.  
At the same time, Wilson was unable to protect US neutral rights from extension of the British 
blockade to mail and all contraband.  During this period, Wilson was also frustrated by his 
inability to initiate peace negotiations. 
Wilson was forced to abandon his use of American moral force for demands that the 
belligerents agree to disarmaments, a League of Nations, and to begin negotiations.  However, 
this final demand was offered without ensuring definite commitments.  By this time, Wilson had 
concluded that a turning point had been reached.  This turning point required Wilson to rely on 
British cooperation to begin peace negotiations.  Wilson was therefore forced to avoid actions 
that consisted of uncompromising demands on Britain to observe American trade rights or risk 
losing British support.
130
 
In March 1916, Wilson was plagued by armed merchant ships and its affect on the 
German submarine campaign.  During this time, Wilson attempted to develop an armed ship 
policy that would get Congressional approval, was defendable to the Allies, and would not start a 
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conflict with Germany.  On 2 March, Wilson decided to urge Britain to pledge that its armed 
ships would not fire on submarines while they warned or searched British ships.  He also decided 
that if Britain refused he could justifiably treating armed ships as men of war.  However, Lansing 
wanted to distinguish between offensive and defensive weapons.  Lansing researched the 
situation and drafted a proposal to establish US policy on armed ships.  It stated the US accepted 
the right of ships to arm for defense and the duty of war ships to warn and allow people to 
evacuate armed ships.  It also stated that the US would consider armed ships auxiliary cruisers if 
US government learns that these ships sail under orders to hunt and destroy submarines or armed 
ships behave in the same manner.  Lansing sent the message to Wilson on 24 April, who had it 
published on 26 April.
131
 
 
The Sussex and the Sussex Pledge 
On 24 March, the Sussex was torpedoed by a submarine injuring four Americans.  Wilson 
viewed this incident as another threat from the u-boat campaign, while his administration saw it 
as a reason to break off relations with Germany.  In response to the Sussex, Wilson preferred to 
wait while his cabinet wanted to break relations with Germany if the German government 
refused to admit that submarine warfare was illegal.  By 7 April, Wilson was still searching for a 
way to hold Germany responsible for its actions and avoid war.  At this time, Wilson‟s 
administration became adamant that Germany would have to abandon its submarine campaign to 
avoid a break in relations with the US.
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In March, Lansing sent Wilson a note that stated the attack on the Sussex repeated the 
Lusitania incident at a time when the American and German governments were close to “an 
amicable settlement” of the Lusitania case.  He wrote, “In these circumstances I do not see how 
we can avoid the issue and remain inactive,” as “Germany has renewed the method of warfare 
which we so strongly protested.”133  Lansing also argued, “The time for writing notes discussing 
the subject has passed.”134  He continued the US could not allow the submarine campaign to 
continue and he urged that Bernstorff be sent back to Germany and diplomatic relations severed 
to force the German government to accept US arguments that the submarine campaign was 
illegal and stop it.
135
 
On 10 April, Lansing sent Wilson a copy of the Sussex note.  The note stated that the 
torpedoing of the Sussex violated the rules of civilized warfare.  It also stated that the US realizes 
the German government has ordered or allowed its submarine commanders to attack merchant 
ships and that this action violates a previous agreement between the US and German 
governments.  The note concluded that the US declared its intentions to severe diplomatic 
relations with Germany unless the German government abandoned submarine warfare against 
merchant ships.
136
  After sending the Sussex note, Wilson was determined to force Germany to 
end its u-boat campaign at the risk of war.  During the negotiations, Wilson agreed to allow a 
                                               
133 Woodrow Wilson, “From Robert Lansing to Wilson,” January 27-May 8, 1916 vol. 36 of The Papers 
edited by Arthur S. Link, David W. Hirst, John E. Little, and Dexter Gordon (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
1981), 371-373. 
134 Wilson, “Robert Lansing to Wilson,” January 27-May 8, 1916, 372. 
135 Wilson, “Robert Lansing to Wilson,” January 27-May 8, 1916, 371-373. 
136 Wilson, “From Robert Lansing to Wilson with Enclosure,” January 27-May 8, 1916, 447-452. 
57 
 
legal submarine campaign against enemy cruisers to continue.  On 7 May, Germany acceded to 
Wilson‟s demands, and Wilson accepted the new submarine campaign.137 
 
The Peak of British Commerce Control 
In the summer of 1916, antagonism developed between the US and the British.  Britain 
became incensed over one of Wilson‟s speeches where he announced that America was not 
interested in the “causes or the objects of this war”.  The main source of the British outrage was 
Wilson‟s use of the word “objects.”  The British were also upset over Wilson‟s continued efforts 
to begin peace negotiations.  Americans were reciprocally upset with a new British trade policy 
that was developed at the Allies‟ Economic Conference in Paris from 14 June to 17 June.  This 
conference decided to limit postwar trade with former allies, neutrals, and enemies effectively 
starting a trade war.
138
 
In addition to the Allies‟ Economic Conference, on 18 July, Britain blacklisted eighty-
five American firms from trading with Britain.  This was viewed as further British attempts to 
control neutral trade.  This action aroused a great deal of anger from the American public, 
Wilson‟s cabinet, the State Department, and Wilson himself.  However, Wilson refused to act 
against the blacklist because he was running for re-election.
139
  On 25 July, Wilson sent a note to 
the British Foreign Office protesting the blacklist.  He argued that the blacklist would have 
“harsh and even disastrous effects upon the trade of the United States.”140  He charged Britain 
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with subjecting American citizens to arbitrary measures and stated that the blacklist allowed 
unlimited interruption of American trade.  It also charged the British government had “too lightly 
and too frequently disregarded international practices and understandings.”141  The blacklist 
became Britain‟s final attempt to extend its blockade over neutral trade.  Wilson‟s protest of 
Britain‟s blacklist was less sharp that his note to Germany over the Sussex case.  The British note 
stopped short of making allegations the British policy was unfriendly because Wilson viewed the 
blacklist was a legal option even if it was detested in America.  Wilson's note to Germany was 
stronger because he considered Germany‟s submarine campaign illegal.142 
 
Final Moves for Peace 
Beginning in August, Germany pressured Wilson to move toward peace.  Ambassador 
Bernstorff supported this by encouraging Wilson to mediate a conference of neutrals and 
belligerents.  However, the Allies continued to refuse these moves preferring to conduct 
negotiations when their military situation had improved.  Germany warned that this was 
impossible, that without peace negotiations the German government would resume its 
unrestricted submarine warfare.  By September, the Allies were pushing for a military victory to 
ensure peace.  On 14 September, French Prime Minister Aristide Briand declared that peace talks 
were “an outrage against the memory of so many heroes that had fallen for France,”  while David 
Lloyd George, the British Prime Minister, said “Germany elected to make it a finish fight…we 
intend to see that Germany has her way.  The fight must be to the finish—to a knock out.”  Lloyd 
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George also said that there can be not outside interference at this stage, and that Britain would 
not tolerate any intervention for peace.
143
 
In spite of this, Wilson continued talks with Bernstorff throughout October as Germany 
continued to pressure Wilson to start peace talks or prepare for war.  The German government 
did not accept Wilson as a peace mediator at this point, because it believed Wilson was aligned 
with the Allies.  As a result, Germany only accepted Wilson‟s help to make appeals for peace.  
On 20 October, Germany‟s situation was stressed to the point that if Wilson did not make a move 
for peace, the German government would resume unrestricted submarine warfare.  On 24 
October, Wilson became aware of this.  In spite of this knowledge, Wilson continued to press the 
belligerents to accept peace.  However, Wilson also realized that the US could no longer remain 
neutral to achieve peace.
144
 
In November 1916, Wilson narrowly won his re-election for President.  Following his re-
election, Wilson refocused on starting peace negotiations.  During November, the international 
situation worsened as Germany drew closer to resuming unrestricted submarine warfare, though 
Germany had already resumed attacking armed British, American, and other neutral merchant 
ships.  On 14 November, Wilson decided he needed to demand that the fighting cease or the US 
would enter the war against Germany for breaking the Sussex pledge.  However, House advised 
Wilson against this decision.  Instead, House advised Wilson to wait even though Wilson felt 
that waiting would cause a diplomatic break with Germany.
145
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In December, Wilson began demanding a peace settlement independent of preliminary 
negotiations between the belligerents.  On 13 December, Wilson sent letters to the Central and 
Entente Powers expressing the other side‟s war terms.146  On 18 December, Wilson sent appeals 
to the belligerents to state their war aims.
147
  Lansing approved of the note but believed that it 
demonstrated that the US was moving closer to entering the war.  This letter was the first 
completely neutral gesture Wilson made during WWI because he was desperately struggling to 
keep the US out of war and begin peace negotiations.
148
 
Unfortunately, Wilson‟s attempt came too late, as the Central Powers rejected his note 
and interference in the war.  On 3 January 1917, Wilson attempted to convince Germany to send 
him its war terms privately.  Unfortunately, Wilson‟s attempt came too late because the German 
government decided to resume unrestricted warfare on 9 January.  Wilson viewed war with 
Germany as undesirable; because of his beliefs, Wilson felt that if America entered the war then 
white civilization would be exhausted by war.  Wilson feared this exhaustion would allow the 
Asian civilizations to dominate the world.  This opinion further demonstrated Wilson‟s belief 
that the fate of western civilization depended on the ability of America to avoid the war.
149
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Preludes to War 
On 10 January, Germany declared that it would resume unrestricted submarine warfare in 
retaliation against armed merchant ship attacks on German submarines.  Germany argued that the 
actions by and orders to armed merchant ships warranted declaring armed merchant ships as war 
ships in accordance with America‟s note from 25 March 1916.  150  Following Germany‟s 
declaration Wilson believed a break in relations with Germany would soon follow.  On 1 
February, Germany sent another note that described its reasons for resuming unrestricted 
warfare.  In an attached memorandum, Germany declared that it would begin unrestricted 
warfare against ships caught in the war zone without additional warning.
151
 
Wilson was deeply disappointed and resented Germany‟s complete reneging of its earlier 
pledges because it made peace negotiations impossible due to the continued British to resistance 
to peace negotiations.  In spite of this, Wilson continued his policy to prevent an American 
intervention in the war.  However, Wilson was now willing to severe diplomatic relations with 
Germany hoping that by breaking relations it would bring “Germany to their senses.”152  From 1 
February to 3 February, Wilson discussed the problems created by breaking relations with 
Germany.  Wilson remained adamant that the US stay out of the war in an attempt to ward off 
domination from the “Yellow race.”153  Wilson also searched for a policy to deal with the u-boat 
crisis. 
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Wilson Breaks Diplomatic Relations with Germany 
On 2 February, Wilson sent Lansing a note describing his intentions to break relations 
with Germany.  Wilson wrote that by breaking relations with Germany America would be in a 
position to accomplish things it could not in strict neutrality.  He wrote that the most important 
thing the US could do was declare Germany an outlaw nation.
154
  On 3 February, Wilson 
addressed Congress and publically announced that the US had broken relations with Germany.  
During his address, Wilson described the numerous incidents his administration had dealt with 
and stated the various defenses Germany had issued to continue its submarine warfare.  He also 
said that the German justifications did not warrant the actions it had taken and that the US could 
no longer maintain relations with the German government.
155
  Wilson broke relations with 
Germany in continuation of his policy that held Germany strictly accountable for its actions.
156
   
Following the break with Germany, Wilson refused to allow American merchant ships to 
be armed.  On 6 February and 16 February, two American ships were sunk, and still Wilson 
refused to act against Germany much to the consternation of his cabinet.  On 10 February, 
Wilson began final negotiations with Germany through the Swiss Foreign Minister Paul Ritter.  
These negotiations eventually failed due to the German government‟s attempts to extend a 1799 
treaty with the US.  Eventually, Wilson refused to conduct further negotiations and Germany 
began unrestricted submarine warfare.  Wilson also attempted to get Austria-Hungary to accept a 
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separate peace settlement that guaranteed its territorial integrity.  This avenue also failed because 
Austria-Hungary refused to accept a separate peace from its allies.
157
 
 
Germany Forces the United States into World War I 
From 12 to 21 March, eight American ships including the Algonquin, Vigilancia, City of 
Memphis, Illinois, and the Heraldton were sunk without warning by German submarines.  These 
actions forced Wilson to ask Congress to declare war.
158
  On 21 March, Wilson gave his 
administration one week to prepare legislation for Congress that would authorize him to declare 
war and scheduled a Joint session of Congress.  On 28 March, Wilson broke diplomatic relations 
with Austria-Hungary.
159
 
On 2 April, Wilson addressed Congress.  Wilson stated that “It will be all the easier for 
us to conduct ourselves as belligerents in a high spirit of right and fairness because we act 
without animus.”160  He continued that “it is a distressing and oppressive duty...which I have 
performed in addressing you…It is a fearful thing to lead this great peaceful people into 
war…But the right is more precious that peace.”161  Wilson‟s address argued that because 
Germany had taken actions that violated American rights and international law, the US needed to 
enter the war to stop the German government.  He stated that the US was fighting the German 
government not the German people, as America was a friend of the German people.  Wilson also 
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stated that the US was entering the war to defend the ideals of democracy, liberty, and 
freedom.
162
  On April 6, Congress approved the declaration of war and Wilson declared war with 
Germany on April 7, officially bringing the US into World War I.
163
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CHAPTER 5 
FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT‟S WAR POLICIES 
 
American foreign relations with Britain during the Second World War rested partly on 
the correspondence and personal relationship between President Franklin D. Roosevelt and 
Prime Minister Winston Churchill.  It also depended on Roosevelt‟s preoccupation with averting 
Britain‟s defeat as a vital part of American security.  FDR used this objective to invite the British 
leadership into dialogue and allowed Britain to receive American aid during the early years of 
World War II.  FDR‟s willingness to create a personal relationship with Churchill during the war 
ensured Britain receiving aid for the duration of the war and laid the foundation for Anglo-
American cooperation following America‟s entry. 
 
The Roosevelt-Churchill Correspondence 
The origin of Churchill and FDR‟s relationship during the war was a personal letter FDR 
sent Churchill on 11 September 1939.  While the letter was sent mainly to Churchill, it included 
an invitation to Churchill and Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain: “What I want you 
[Churchill] and the Prime Minister to know is that I shall at all times welcome it if you will keep 
in touch with me personally with anything you want me to know about.  You can always send 
sealed letters through your pouch or my pouch.”164  This open invitation provided the British 
leadership with personal access to FDR even though Chamberlain was cynical of American aid.  
This letter opened a conduit for the two men to share both personal and professional information, 
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and develop a friendship during the war.  These letters also established the foundation for future 
cooperation between the British and the United States.   
Originally, the correspondence after FDR‟s initial invitation was sparse, but after 
Churchill‟s appointment to Prime Minister in May 1940 the volume of communications rapidly 
increased.  The FDR‟s and Churchill‟s personal correspondence did not begin until the war; 
however, this had not stopped either man from admiring the other from afar.  Churchill was 
known to admire FDR‟s New Deal attempts to end the Great Depression, while FDR admired 
Churchill for warning others of the dangers posed by Adolf Hitler and the uselessness of 
appeasement.  Churchill‟s response to FDR‟s invitation to open wartime correspondence 
reflected this mutual admiration.
165
  During WWII, Churchill did not hesitate to use this direct 
channel to request American assistance.
166
  Eventually, these letters became an important means 
of gaining additional American support for British wartime needs. 
FDR‟s invitation to personal correspondence with Churchill provided justification for 
FDR to ask Congress to provide Britain with military supplies.  It was also FDR‟s attempt to 
maintain control of his administration by having a private line of communication to Churchill 
without influence from the rest of his administration.  FDR encouraged the communication with 
Churchill due to Churchill‟s previous opinions of Adolf Hitler and military preparedness.167  The 
Roosevelt-Churchill correspondence was useful because it allowed FDR to avoid some of the 
problems Wilson faced in World War I with the European leadership, and Roosevelt was 
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determined to avoid similar problems.  The Roosevelt-Churchill correspondence allowed the two 
men to develop a friendship, unlike Wilson and British Prime Minister David Lloyd George who 
were allies as well as antagonists.   
In addition to fostering a relationship between Roosevelt and Churchill, the 
communications allowed FDR„s military advisors to gain access to Churchill‟s military advisors.  
In this fashion, the correspondence also created a basis for future collaboration when the U.S. 
joined the war.  From 1939 to 1945, FDR and Churchill wrote 1,700 letters; these letters differed 
in style as their authors differed in personality.  FDR‟s letters were concise and occasionally 
included input from his advisors, while Churchill‟s letters were longer and were written without 
additional input.  The Roosevelt-Churchill correspondence established the Anglo-American 
collaboration as FDR and Churchill used it to exchange suggestions and desires.  By February 
1940, Roosevelt had repeatedly expressed a desire for a face-to-face meeting that Churchill 
eventually agreed to attend.  Both men had different agendas for the conference, but their 
communications ensured that it did take place.   
In August 1941, FDR and Churchill had their first face-to-face meeting of WWII; this 
was also the first opportunity for the British and American military advisors to meet.  In this 
way, the letters helped establish Anglo-American cooperation and implemented the methods of 
joint Anglo-American military operations.  While these letters were important in the 
establishment of the Anglo-American unity, they offer little information on the actual 
conferences and actual joint operations as these were delivered by verbal communications over 
transatlantic telephone conversations or through envoys.
168
  Notwithstanding the lack of 
information in these letters on actual methods and actions for the war, they reveal other 
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important information on the various ways Churchill and FDR communicated and what they 
communicated.   
 
The Correspondence Initiates American Aid 
From the beginning, the letters Churchill and FDR exchanged were open and informal.  
As the British situation deteriorated, Churchill realized the British would need massive aid from 
the US to defeat Germany, he also believed that Britain and the United States shared mutual 
interests and purposes.  Acting on this opinion, Churchill used his communications with FDR to 
keep FDR informed on British problems and needs.  While FDR encouraged and sympathized 
with the British condition, he was often unable to act on Churchill‟s requests.169  This 
predicament repeated itself during the first half of 1940 as German forces conquered Europe.
170
   
Eventually, German victories made it possible for FDR to persuade the American public 
that Britain was a defensive partner against the Axis powers.  This allowed FDR to acquire 
Congressional approval for modification of the neutrality laws to include the cash-and-carry 
principle, increase defensive spending, and approve the Selective Service Act.  Following the 
French surrender, FDR worked to secure the destroyers for bases deal.
171
  After receiving 
information in the fall of 1940 on the deteriorating British dollar situation, FDR began focusing 
on the passage of the Lend-Lease Act.
172
  The communication channel between FDR and 
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Churchill provided FDR with valuable information, but it was not until events occurred that he 
was able to act on it. 
While both men were admirable and friendly with the other, large and small differences 
existed.  Some of the differences between Churchill and FDR‟s vision of the postwar world 
included the British Empire and the US open door policy.  Churchill also believed a special unity 
existed between Britain and America as English speaking peoples, an opinion FDR did not share.  
Once the US entered the war, their differences became apparent.  While both men disagreed over 
strategy and tactics, their personal relationship was important for maintaining Anglo-American 
cooperation during the war.
173
  It was FDR and Churchill‟s personal relationship that allowed 
Anglo-American cooperation to continue during the war in spite of their numerous policy 
differences. 
While Roosevelt‟s correspondence with Churchill was valuable as a conduit for the 
exchange of information and ideas, it did not provide Britain with all the aid it first requested.  It 
was not until after France surrendered to Germany, that FDR was able to convince Congress to 
begin sending substantial aid to Britain.  Prior to sending aid to Britain, FDR had an obvious pro-
Britain opinion, though he did little in 1939 and the first half of 1940 to undo US diplomatic 
neutrality.  FDR was often forced to reject many of the Allied appeals even if it worsened the 
Allies abilities to wage war.
174
  Even with these difficulties, the correspondence between FDR 
and Churchill was necessary for American and British cooperation.  The first requests that 
Churchill sent to FDR were for American action to encourage the French to continue fighting.
175
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Churchill wrote to FDR in the hopes that he could encourage FDR to demonstrate America‟s 
dedication to the French effort in a manner that would strengthen the French resolve and 
encourage the French not to sign an armistice with Germany.  Churchill urged FDR that 
“Everything must be done to keep France in the fight and to prevent any idea of the fall of 
Paris…The hope with which you inspired them may give them strength to persevere.”176   
These requests continued and Churchill further encouraged FDR to “strengthen Reynaud 
the utmost you can and try to tip the balance in favour of the best and longest possible French 
resistance.”177  On 14 June 1940, Churchill again requested American intervention “up to the 
extreme limit open to you.”  On 15 June, he stated that only “A declaration that the United States 
will if necessary, enter the war might save France.”178  These requests were circumvented by 
FDR‟s replies in which he clearly expressed his inability to provide France with aid, though he 
continued to encourage cooperation with Britain. 
Before the US entered the war, FDR often replied that the US government was doing 
everything possible to aid the Allies; however, US opinion prevented him from publically 
making commitments or asking for Congressional authorization for requested actions that he 
received from Churchill throughout the war.
179
  On 15 June, Churchill dispatched a letter 
describing the likelihood of a German victory in France considering of its current success.  
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Despite Churchill‟s appeals, FDR continued to avoid directly acting on Churchill‟s requests for 
US intervention to prevent the French from signing the armistice with Germany.
180
 
Following the French surrender Churchill began sending requests to FDR for thirty or 
forty obsolete American destroyers to counter the increased number of German submarines in 
the Atlantic.
181
  France‟s defeat had lowered FDR‟s caution to transfer American destroyers to 
Britain, and he began searching for methods that would allow Britain to take possession of the 
destroyers.  In response FDR‟s administration found legal ambiguity that allowed the United 
States to transfer the destroyers to Britain.  It was not until repeated depictions of a British defeat 
forced FDR to accept the negotiated exchange of British bases for American destroyers.
182
  
 
Major Effects of the Roosevelt-Churchill Correspondence 
In spite of the destroyer deal‟s success, the negotiations were complex and politically 
difficult as FDR and Churchill had to move within politically acceptable parameters.  To ensure 
success FDR‟s advisors urged Britain to guarantee that in the event Germany defeated Britain, 
Germany would not gain control of the British Navy.  During early negotiations Churchill 
refused to provide this guarantee formally, instead he proposed to exchange the American 
destroyers for leases to British bases in its colonies.   
In August 1940, FDR and senior members of his staff began drafting early provisions for 
the agreement.  FDR publically announced that US was involved in negotiations with Britain on 
16 August to acquire leases of British bases for greater American defense.  The announcement 
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was worded to encourage support from Congress and the American public.  Eventually, FDR and 
his administration overcame the obstacles and transferred the destroyers in exchange for 99-year 
leases on British bases (after Churchill unofficially agreed to US conditions on the British 
Navy).
183
 
Prior to the American entry into the war, Churchill repeatedly urged FDR to begin 
escorting convoys to Britain to ensure that orders were successfully delivered.  At the time of 
Churchill‟s request FDR was unable to comply.  FDR supported the idea of escorting convoys 
through the Atlantic as early as the winter of 1940 and 1941.  However, domestic politics made 
implementation of this policy dangerous.
184
  In April, FDR gained public opinion for escorts as 
heavy damages were inflicted on convoys from German submarine wolf packs.  At this time, 
FDR contemplated expanding American patrols in the Atlantic by dispatching ships from Pearl 
Harbor to strengthen the Atlantic Fleet, but due to training problems and Congressional 
opposition FDR only sent a fraction of the ships he originally intended.  On 15 April, FDR 
ordered one carrier and four destroyers to join the Atlantic Fleet to intensify and extend navy 
patrols in the Atlantic.  Still, FDR had no intentions to begin American escorts to Europe even as 
he sent three battleships, four cruisers, and additional destroyers to the Atlantic in June.
185
 
At the Atlantic Conference in August, FDR promised Churchill that the US Navy would 
begin escorting convoys in the Atlantic and that he would order patrols as far as 300 miles 
around the convoys to search for submarines to destroy.  After the Atlantic conference FDR did 
not order escorts to begin immediately; it was not until September that FDR ordered escorts to 
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commence.  On 4 September, the US destroyer Greer was attacked by a German submarine.
186
  
FDR responded to the Greer attack by ordering the US Navy to conduct search and destroy 
missions in the Atlantic against German submarines.  He also ordered the US Navy to begin 
escorts on 11 September 1941.
187
   
As the war continued and the British situation deteriorated in Europe, FDR worked 
overtime to increase the aid America provided to Britain.  Between 1939 and 1941, the letters 
between Churchill and FDR were important in developing the destroyers for bases deal and the 
Lend-Lease Act.  In the latter part of 1940, FDR learned that Britain‟s supply of cash was 
dwindling to the point that Britain could no longer afford to pay for its orders.  On 7 December, 
Churchill sent an urgent personal letter to Roosevelt describing Britain‟s desperate financial 
situation and its continued need for American supplies.
188
  Churchill wrote, “The moment 
approaches when we shall no longer be able to pay cash for shipping and other supplies” he 
continued that it would be unacceptable for the Allies to win at the physical and financial cost of 
Britain.  Churchill concluded how he hoped the U.S. would not limit its aid “only to such 
munitions of war and commodities as could be immediately paid for.”189  FDR used Churchill‟s 
letter as support for sending the Lend-Lease Act to Congress.  The Lend Lease Act allowed the 
British to pay in kind for its orders and therefore continue receiving American aid.
190
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On 17 December 1940, FDR conducted a press conference in an attempt to garner 
support for extended aid to Britain and to gain passage for Lend-Lease.  During the conference, 
FDR discussed the various ways the US could provide aid to Britain.  To support further 
increased aid to Britain and to support the costs of Lend-Lease, Roosevelt provided the following 
illustration: 
Suppose my neighbor‟s home catches fire, and I have a length of garden hose four or five 
hundred feet away.  If he can take my garden hose and connect it up with his hydrant, I 
may help him to put out his fire.  Now, what do I do?  I don‟t say to him before the 
operation, “Neighbor, my garden hose cost me $15; you have to pay me $15 for it.”  
What is the transaction that goes on?  I don‟t want $15—I want my garden hose back 
after the fire is over.  All right.  If it goes through the fire all right, intact, without any 
damage to it, he gives it back to me and thanks me very much for the use of it.  But 
suppose it gets smashed up—holes in it—during the fire;  we don‟t have to have too 
much formality about it, but I say to him, “I was glad to lend you that hose; I see I can‟t 
use it any more, it‟s all smashed up.”  He says, “How many feet of it were there?”  I tell 
him, “There were 150 feet of it.”  He says “All right, I will replace it.”  Now if I get a 
nice garden hose back, I am in pretty good shape.
191
 
This illustration was devised in a way to demonstrate that while America would pay for supplies 
to Britain, the British would either return any undamaged supplies or unused supplies or replace 
used or damaged supplies in kind. 
 
The Atlantic Conference 
FDR and Churchill did more than communicate needs for war materials and possible 
American intervention.  During their correspondence FDR expressed a desire for an in-person 
meeting, and in August 1941 FDR and Churchill had their first WWII meeting off the coast of 
Newfoundland.  At what would become known as the Atlantic Conference, the United States and 
Britain took steps to develop further diplomatic and military relations.  The conference provided 
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an opportunity for the British and American military to create a military relationship for the 
remainder of the war.
192
   
The main aspect of the Atlantic Conference was the cementing of Churchill and FDR‟s 
relationship.  FDR‟s main reason for the conference was to develop a set of ideas and values that 
the Allies were defending that could also be used in the postwar world.  This agreement, named 
the Atlantic Charter by the press, had a range of issues from basic freedoms to trade restrictions 
to self-determination to economic liberalism.  In spite of FDR‟s desire, Churchill did not agree 
with the terms and was seeking war commitments from the U.S., but Churchill recognized that 
an agreement with the United States was of the greatest importance.
193
 
Churchill on the other hand had hoped to use the Atlantic Conference to gain an 
American commitment on the war.  Unfortunately, FDR was unwilling to fulfill Churchill‟s 
desires to provide an American declaration of war and refused to discuss details of the war 
during the conference.  At the conference, FDR informed Churchill that he wanted to avoid 
entering into secret agreements and military or political commitments, although he did accept 
some of Churchill‟s war suggestions for further considerations.  Still, FDR was only willing to 
act on some of Churchill‟s suggestions, mainly expanding the American safety patrol in the 
Atlantic, but he refused to allow American ships to convoy merchant ships to Britain.   
While the Atlantic Conference was able to unite FDR and Churchill further on long-term 
goals, there were still occasions where neither man was willing or able to agree to the requests 
the other made.  In spite of their differences, the British and American governments were able to 
create a relationship, and the military leaders were able to create a joint military plan for when 
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the US entered the war.
194
  In many ways, FDR‟s correspondence with Churchill affected many 
of the actions he took before the United States officially entered the war. 
American Neutrality and the Roosevelt-Churchill Correspondence 
During the war, FDR‟s diplomacy with Britain provided the British war effort with all aid 
short of war; however, this did not begin until after France surrendered in June 1940.  Despite 
FDR‟s obvious pro-British position, he did little diplomatically to undo America‟s neutrality.  
His first action implemented cash and carry, which was technically neutral although it mainly 
aided the Allies‟ war efforts.  This continued through Churchill‟s first appeal for destroyers in 
May 1940 that FDR politely responded to but included, “A step of that kind could not be taken 
except with the specific authorization of the Congress and I am not certain that it would be wise 
for that suggestion to be made at the moment.”195  By this time, the Germans had amassed 
numerous victories and FDR continued to circumvent Churchill‟s appeals and suggestions.  It 
was not until sometime after the French surrender that FDR began plans for the destroyers for 
bases deal. 
While FDR was willing to increase the amount and type of aid sent to Britain after the 
destroyer deal, his correspondence with Churchill reveals that none of these moves were 
precursors to US intervention in WWII.  These letters demonstrate that while the US was no 
longer neutral when the destroyer deal was completed it was still a nonbelligerent.  Whether 
FDR‟s actions destined the US to enter the war or authorized actions that made it harder for the 
US to avoid active participation in WWII, his correspondence with Churchill did not establish 
any secret arrangements or commitments that would involve the US actively in the war. 
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From Churchill‟s communications, FDR was encouraged to take actions that increasingly 
moved the US from neutral to nonbelligerent.  The major developments along this course were 
cash and carry, the destroyers deal, the Lend-Lease Act, and the Atlantic Conference.  As the 
Roosevelt-Churchill communication continued both men recognized their interdependency and 
while Churchill desired active American participation at times, FDR refused to provide Britain 
with more aid than politically feasible. 
 
Roosevelt and Diplomacy with Japan 
In World War II while the war in Europe dominated FDR‟s foreign policy, Asia 
repeatedly diverted his attention as Japan conducted expansionist policies in Southeast Asia.  The 
Japanese agenda began with the Japanese invasion of Manchuria in 1931 as a remedy for 
economic problems caused by the Great Depression.  By 1939, Japanese conquests were 
threatening the rest of the South Pacific, in particular the Allied colonies of Dutch East Indies 
and French Indochina.  As Japanese plans unfolded, FDR was forced to create a policy in 
Southeast Asia that would maintain peace while he focused on Europe and stalled to make war 
preparations. 
 
Direction of Japanese-American Diplomacy 
In 1935, FDR approved a foreign policy that used inaction and pacification to deal with 
Japan.  FDR‟s approval of this policy did not ensure that he personally directed this policy; 
instead, FDR left this duty to Secretary of State Cordell Hull.  It was Hull‟s responsibility to 
outline and initiate the specific terms of this policy.  By delegating American diplomacy with 
Japan to Hull, FDR was able to focus on Europe up to 1941 when Japanese actions made it 
78 
 
necessary for FDR to take some actions.
196
  From 1939-1940, Hull rarely received input from 
FDR during his diplomatic talks with Japan.  It was not until 1941 that FDR began providing 
Hull with instructions for conducting Japanese-American talks.
197
 
Hull‟s direction of American-Japanese talks followed a Wilsonian agenda that focused on 
maintaining the Open Door policy and self-determination.  Hull repeatedly used morality in his 
diplomatic talks with the Japanese Ambassador and tried to get the Japanese imperial 
government to submit to it.
198
  In addition, Hull did not support the use of economic and trade 
sanctions when he dealt with the Japanese and up to 1940 repeatedly convinced FDR not to 
authorize such actions.  During WWII, FDR and Hull disagreed on how to conduct US policy 
towards Japan.  The main divergence was Hull‟s preference to use diplomacy to stall Japan, 
while FDR preferred strong actions.
199
 
Hull believed that diplomatic talks were less likely to compel Japan to attack than the 
alternative of using economic sanctions.
200
  FDR believed that strong actions were needed to 
deter Japan and force it to acquiesce to US demands.  FDR based this belief on reports that Japan 
needed large quantities of US goods to survive and that Japan‟s diplomatic gestures were 
insincere.  In the 1930s, FDR was forced to decide between authorizing Hull‟s preference or his 
own preference.  FDR chose to direct the policy by using strong actions and maintaining 
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diplomacy.
201
  Hull‟s moral diplomatic principles, Wilsonian agenda, and determination to 
maintain the status quo in the years prior to America's entry into WWII was as much a part of 
American foreign policy as FDR‟s unwillingness to direct US policy in Asia.202  
 
American Understanding of Japanese War Finances 
Beginning with Japan‟s invasion of China in 1937, the US government had calculated 
that Japan could not afford a long war because it lacked hard currency and imported essential 
raw materials.  These raw materials included iron, steel, cooper, lead, zinc, petroleum, wool, 
leather, lumber, chemicals, and food because the Japanese Empire lacked them.  Due to Japan‟s 
necessity to purchase these exports in gold and hard currency, the US Treasury Department 
estimated that Japanese banks would be depleted by these purchases thus rendering Japan 
internationally bankrupt forcing it to abandon the war in China.
203
   
The US government used these predictions to determine a policy that observed and 
studied Japanese finances.  These predictions were based on calculations that Japan would go 
bankrupt as early as September 1939 and as late as mid 1941.  Unfortunately, these calculations 
were made without knowledge that Japan had created a secret cache of gold and US dollars that 
kept delaying its bankruptcy.  It was not until late 1940 that the US Treasury Department 
discovered this cache, which was capable of financing Japan‟s war into 1943.204   
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Early American Responses to Japanese Actions 
Following Japan‟s announcement of its plan to create a “new order in East Asia” between 
Japan, Manchukuo, and China in 1939, FDR and Hull imposed a moral embargo against airplane 
sales to Japan.  The embargo did not compel Japan to cease its plans and it continued expanding 
in Asia.  Hull and FDR responded to continued Japanese expansion by sending additional verbal 
and written protests.  In addition,  FDR also authorized a loan to China in an attempt to delay 
Japan‟s invasion.  In a blow to American policy, the Craigie-Arita declaration, or Tientsin 
settlement forced Britain to accept Japan‟s position in China.  The Roosevelt administration 
responded by issuing a new round of diplomatic protests while avoiding strong actions in 
Southeast Asia.
205
   
Upon discovering Japan‟s hidden assets, the Treasury Department debated freezing 
Japanese assets to deny Japan money to finance its war.  In response, Washington officials 
considered enacting the Trading with the Enemy Act; however, earlier predictions of Japan‟s 
pending bankruptcy dissuaded the administration from enacting policies to intiate Japan‟s 
bankruptcy.  In 1939, Roosevelt inquired into prohibiting the Japanese sales of gold to the 
Treasury.  Morgenthau informed FDR such policies would hurt the US more than Japan and that 
an embargo against shipping commodities to Japan was a better policy.
206
  The Treasury 
Department‟s discovery of Japan's secret cache of dollars forced Japan to quickly remove its 
money from US banks or spend it abroad.  The discovery also revived interests to use strong 
financial controls against Japan to force an end of the Sino-Japanese War.
207
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During this time, domestic opinion pushed FDR to place an embargo against shipping 
war supplies and materials to Japan.  In spite of this, FDR and Hull refused to initiate an 
embargo; both men hoped that not establishing an embargo would prevent additional hostilities.  
Negative public opinion increased following the Tientsin settlement; in response, FDR instructed 
Hull to deliver a presidential protest.  On 26 July, FDR announced that the US was abandoning 
the 1911 commercial treaty with Japan in six months.  This announcement provided FDR with 
the public reaction he wanted while allowing him to avoid imposing an embargo against 
Japan.
208
 
In the second half of 1939, FDR continued to follow a foreign policy that was designed to 
restrain Japan and maintain peace in the Pacific.  FDR‟s decision to abandon the 1911 treaty was 
his first authorized use of economic sanctions against Japan.  This 1911 treaty between Japan and 
America allowed US and Japanese companies and citizens the right to conduct domestic 
commerce and open consulates as well as granting ships free port access and equal travelers‟ 
rights.  The treaty could only be abrogated by either side with six months notice.  By abrogating 
the treaty, the US could discriminate against Japanese commerce.
209
   
 
Beginning of American Economic Restrictions Against Japan 
Following the Roosevelt‟s administrations economic action, an American presence was 
established in the Pacific as the US fleet was stationed in Manila Bay and Pearl Harbor and 
ordered to conduct naval maneuvers in the Hawaiian waters.  FDR also instructed Hull to inform 
Japan that economic sanctions would be used if the United States and Japan could not maintain 
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the possibility of reaching an accord.  FDR‟s decision was designed to strengthen Japanese 
moderates and weaken desires to make additional incursions into the Allied colonies in the 
Pacific.  At first, the policy appeared to be succeeding, but in January 1940 tensions between 
China and Japan increased, and Japan renewed its efforts to create a “new order in East Asia”.210   
Japan‟s “new order” included expansion into the British, French, and Dutch colonies in 
the Pacific.  It began with an invasion of French Indochina in 1940.  These actions increased 
calls from China, Britain, and France for US actions, which FDR refused.  In July, after Japan 
forced Britain to close the Burma Road, FDR and his administration began debating the US 
policy against Japan; part of the debate included a plan presented by Secretary of the Treasury 
Henry Morgenthau, Jr. to use an oil embargo to deter Japan.  However, FDR was in the process 
of running for a third term and was cautious about initiating an action that could endanger his 
chances for reelection, although FDR supported Morgenthau‟s plan he did not execute the 
proposal.
211
 
FDR‟s reluctance to begin economic and trade sanctions only lasted for so long; by July 
1940 FDR was given an opportunity to begin using economic and trade sanctions against Japan.  
On 2 July, the National Defense Act was passed, which authorized FDR to limit or embargo 
military equipment, munitions, or military material by presidential proclamation.  It also 
included an article that allowed FDR to limit or embargo those materials considered vital to 
national security.
212
  With Morgenthau‟s influence, FDR used the National Defense Act to 
initiate an embargo of petroleum, petroleum products, and scrap metal exports on Japan.   
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FDR was also influenced by reports of an increase in Japanese orders for high-grade 
aviation fuel from the US. in an attempt to deplete US supplies.  FDR responded by signing a 
Treasury Department proclamation limiting oil and scrap metal exports to Japan.  This 
proclamation was delayed when Sumner Welles protested that the State Department had not seen 
the proclamation and argued that the restrictions in the proclamation would provoke hostilities 
from Japan.  This forced FDR to modify the order to restrict exports of aviation fuel, aviation 
lubricants, and melting scrap to Japan.
213
 
Between July and October 1940, FDR instructed the State Department to ease Japan‟s 
ability to purchase American oil in an attempt to keep Japan out of the Dutch East Indies.  This 
included allowing the Japanese to take advantage of a loophole in FDR‟s proclamation to 
purchase mid-grade gasoline.  FDR also authorized the State Department to fulfill sixty percent 
of Japan‟s demand for increased Dutch colony oil shipments.214  While FDR was willing to 
tolerate oil shipments to Japan, he was unwilling to allow Japan to receive exports of scrap 
metal.   
As Japan continued its expansionist drive in Asia, it began exerting pressure on Vichy 
France to grant access to Indochina.  Simultaneously, Japan increased its orders for American 
scrap metal, threatening to create a shortage of scrap metal and oil in the US.  On 13 September, 
in response to Japanese actions, FDR began looking for methods to embargo scrap metal to 
Japan instead of embargoing oil.
215
  On 26 September, following Japan‟s invasion of Indochina, 
FDR announced a full embargo of scrap metal on Japan.  Embargoes against Japan on shipments 
                                               
213 Dallek, Franklin D. Roosevelt, 240. 
214 Dallek, Franklin D. Roosevelt, 241. 
215 Reynolds, From Munich, 90-91. 
84 
 
of scrap metal were augmented by other embargoes.  In addition to ordering an embargo on scrap 
metal, FDR instructed the Department of Agriculture to stop paying subsidies for Asian wheat 
exports because Japan was the main buyer.
216
  These embargoes did not stop Japan from signing 
the Tripartite Pact with Berlin and Rome.  However, the signing provoked interventionists in 
FDR‟s administration to push for a complete oil embargo and orders sending the Pacific fleet to 
Singapore.
217
 
 
A Division in the Roosevelt Administration 
The signing of the Tripartite Pact also increased a division among FDR‟s advisors over 
American policy on Japan.  The division consisted of a disagreement over the use of diplomacy 
or sanctions when deterring Japanese aggression.  Hull, Welles, and FDR‟s military advisors 
preferred diplomacy as a means to discourage additional Japanese aggression, provide time for 
military preparations, and continue aiding Britain.  Morgenthau, Secretary of the Navy Frank 
Knox, and Secretary of War Henry Stimson preferred the use of economic and trade sanctions to 
deter Japanese aggression in the Pacific.
  218
   
This division often forced FDR to follow one recommendation then alter the decision to 
include the other side‟s.  This infighting caused FDR to revise several authorizations concerning 
his Japanese policy.  This included the Treasury proclamations on oil and material embargoes 
that FDR authorized by 1941.  On example was FDR‟s intention to authorize a proposal by 
Stimson and Secretary of the Interior Harold Ickes to embargo all trade with Japan and conduct 
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naval patrols in the Pacific.  After protests from other members of his administration, FDR 
reneged on this as well.  From September 1940 to December 1940 FDR authorized embargoes on 
everything but oil to Japan in attempts to pressure Japan to end its expansion in Asia.
219
   
 
American Restrictions Harden 
From January to November, FDR also issued moral protests and diplomatic warnings to 
Japan while he allowed Hull to conduct talks with the Japanese in an attempt to settle Japanese-
American differences.  Although FDR placed little faith in a successful settlement from the talks, 
he allowed the talks to continue as a means to stall the Japanese.
220
  Between June and July, 
Japanese actions caused a renewal of domestic pressure on FDR to begin an oil embargo against 
Japan.  Yet, FDR continued not to act fearing an oil embargo would provoke Japan into attacking 
Russia or invade the Pacific.  It was not until the summer of 1941 that Japanese advances forced 
FDR to authorize economic and financial sanctions against Japan.
221
  
Before the US entry into the war, Morgenthau and the Treasury Department were eager 
to use export controls to wage an economic war against Japan.  To be most effective against 
Japan a financial freeze would provide Morgenthau the necessary powers to ensure that Japan 
could not purchase the needed materials to continue its war with China.
222
  On 25 February 1941, 
Morgenthau was informed that in view of current problems Japan was vulnerable to financial 
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crisis if its US assets were frozen.
223
  On 24 July, Washington announced that Japanese assets in 
the US were frozen.  By the time the announcement was made Japan had already withdrawn $29 
million out of the original $160 million it had in American bank accounts for purchases in Latin 
America or transfers to non-US accounts.
224
 
On 24 July, FDR ordered all Japanese assets in the US to be frozen and authorized further 
restrictions on trade to Japan; however, FDR still refused to order an oil embargo against Japan.  
Due to a failure of communication, the omission of oil from the trade restrictions was not clearly 
expressed.  This allowed State Department officials to act as though a total embargo of trade and 
oil was in effect against Japan and Japanese leaders responded in a similar manner.  In addition, 
an ambiguous announcement on 1 August that petroleum export licenses had to be resubmitted 
was not properly transmitted to Japan creating a de facto oil embargo.  FDR was originally 
unaware of the de facto embargo; however, after he became aware of it he refused to remove it.  
From 1939-1941, FDR defended his refusal to order an oil embargo against Japan as a means to 
keep Japan out of the Dutch East Indies and prevent war from beginning in the Pacific between 
the US and Japan.  FDR refused to remove the de facto oil embargo believing it would make the 
US appear weak and that Japan would exploit it.
225
 
In January 1941, the Japanese sent Admiral Kichisaburo Nomura to replace the Japanese 
Ambassador to the US in an attempt to improve Japanese-American relations.  FDR and Hull 
officially received Nomura in February; at this time, FDR left Hull in charge of the diplomatic 
talks.  These talks continued through November when negotiations broke down days before the 
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Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor.  While Hull was conducting talks with Nomura, FDR continued 
looking for ways to stop Japan including providing aid to China through Lend-Lease.  The 
debate over the diplomacy or sanctions continued and FDR continued to adopt actions from both 
to maintain peace in the Pacific.
226
   
In April, Japanese-American talks began to breakdown as Japan urged the State 
Department to accept its peace terms that included demands that the US end its aid to China and 
accept Japanese positions in the Pacific.  Hull responded to this demand with American terms 
that required Japan to respect territorial integrity, national sovereignty, the Open Door Policy, 
and the status quo in the Pacific.  Japan responded with a second proposal that Hull rejected 
because it did not contain the principles he outlined in his earlier response that he deemed 
necessary for negotiations to continue.
227
  This move created a temporary breakdown in 
negotiations between America and Japan as both sides restrategized. 
Following this breakdown of negotiations, Japan decided to move aggressively and 
issued demands to the Vichy government to grant Japanese troops access into Indochina.  US 
Naval intelligence provided FDR and his administration with this information from a code 
breaker called “magic” which deciphered Japanese diplomatic cables.  This allowed FDR to view 
Japanese attempts to resume diplomatic talks as insincere, because Japan continued to make 
plans for expanding into Southeast Asia.  In spite of this belief, FDR allowed diplomatic talks to 
resume in an attempt to delay war in the Pacific.
228
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In August, before FDR had the Atlantic Conference with Churchill, the Japanese Minister 
to the US presented Hull with a settlement offer.  The settlement contained offers that would 
limit Japanese troops in Indochina and China if the US would cease military maneuvers in the 
South Pacific, restore normal Japanese-American trade, and allow Japan access to natural 
resources in the Pacific.  Hull did not approve of the offer; he also rejected a proposal on 5 
August for FDR and Prime Minister Prince Konoye meet.  Hull rejected this proposal as he 
believed that no gains could be made from a meeting between Konoye and FDR.  On 17 August, 
after the Atlantic Conference, FDR sent Nomura a warning against Japanese expansion into the 
Pacific.  FDR also informed Nomura that he would only meet with Konoye if Japan suspended 
its expansionist activities and began a peaceful program in the Pacific.  On 28 August, Nomura 
presented FDR with another letter from Konoye pleading for a meeting in Hawaii.  FDR replied 
that Hawaii was too far away while Alaska was more suitable.
229
 
On 6 September, a Japanese government meeting was held that decided to continue war 
preparations to be completed by the end of November as a contingency in case the Japanese 
Foreign Office failed to force Britain and the US to accept Japanese demands end the same 
period.  This information was also provided by US intelligence and it allowed FDR to refuse 
answering Konoye‟s request, leaving the reply to Hull who issued a statement similar to his April 
1941 reply that demanded Japanese acquiescence of American principles for a meeting to take 
place.
230
  In spite of these barriers, Japanese-American diplomacy continued as FDR supported 
continued talks in an effort to gain time for US preparations.   
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Negotiations with Japan Stall 
From 1939 to 1941, the majority of talks between Japan and the US centered on resolving 
differences, though by October 1941, it was becoming evident that these differences were 
irreconcilable.  On 16 October, a new cabinet came to power in Tokyo as Prince Konoye 
resigned and General Hideki Tojo became the new Prime Minister.  This change in leadership 
increased Japan‟s willingness to risk war with the US.  Still, this move did not alter the advice 
from FDR‟s military advisors who continued to argue against issuing a warning to Japan about 
its expansion.  This forced FDR to develop another method to continue his policy to stall Japan 
and delay for time to prepare.
231
     
Diplomatic talks resumed in November under a new direction as FDR considered the 
various methods to stall Japan to provide the military with more time to prepare for war.  On 6 
November, FDR discussed plans for a truce with Japan with Stimson.  When FDR suggested the 
truce last for six months Stimson argued against the idea.  Stimson argued that a six-month truce 
would prevent the US from defending the Philippines and would alienate China.  On 7 
November, FDR stressed the importance of maintaining diplomatic channels with Japan to Hull.  
FDR asked Hull to “‟stress every nerve to satisfy and keep on good relations with the Japanese 
negotiators.  Don‟t let the talks deteriorate and break up if you can possibly help it‟…‟Let us 
make no move of ill will.  Let us do nothing to precipitate a crisis‟.”232  Most of FDR‟s desire to 
continue diplomacy was due to information received from “magic” deciphers that covered 
messages sent from Tokyo to Nomura between 4 and 5 November that stated Japan would try 
one last time to find an accommodation with the US.  If accommodations were not successful, 
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then diplomacy would end by 25 November.  This date was later extended to 29 November in 
later communications.
233
 
Diplomacy Fails 
The final negotiations between the US and Japan began on 10 November when Nomura 
presented Hull with Japan‟s first offer called Plan A.  Plan A discussed Japanese-American 
differences but offered no solutions; instead Japan offered an agreement similar to the Tripartite 
Pact that would guarantee Japanese neutrality unless the US went to war with Germany.  Hull 
refused this proposal because it did not include his past proposals.  In the period between 14-18 
November, Nomura and Saburo Kurusu attempted to present a modus vivendi that would be a 
temporary agreement between the US and Japan.  However, Tokyo rejected this on 18 November 
and ordered Nomura and Kurusu to present Plan B.
234
   
Plan B offered that Japan and the US would not make any military advances into 
Southeast Asia and the South Pacific except for French Indochina to allow the Japanese to fight 
China.  In return, Japan would withdraw troops from Southern Indochina into Northern 
Indochina and completely withdraw after an “equitable Pacific peace” was established.  In 
addition, both sides would cooperation to gain goods from the Dutch East Indies and restore pre-
freeze conditions and the US would not interfere in efforts to restore Sino-Japanese peace.
235
 
On 17 November, FDR instructed Hull to get Japan to agree to a six-month plan that 
would resume Japanese-American economic relations in return for an end to Japanese troop 
buildup in the Pacific; in spite of these orders, FDR noted he had little faith in the proposal‟s 
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success.  At the same time, the State Department drafted an American modus vivendi.  The 
diplomatic situation continued to deteriorate from 22 to 26 November, as the Japanese refused to 
stop their expansion into the Pacific while internal and international pressure opposed the modus 
vivendi.
236
 
Hull replied to Japan‟s Plan B on 26 November with a ten-point memorandum that 
demanded Japan withdrawal from the South Pacific and Japan‟s acceptance of the status quo in 
return for US trade and financial assistance, which Tokyo rejected.
237
  On 6 December, FDR sent 
a personal message to Emperor Hirohito in a final attempt to maintain diplomacy and stall a war 
in the Pacific.  FDR appealed to Hirohito on the principles of peace and “in the right of nations to 
live and let live.”  He argued that by ending the Sino-Japanese War Japan could create peace.  
FDR also appealed to Hirohito to withdraw Japanese forces from French Indochina as another 
way to create peace in Southeast Asia.  Unfortunately, the message was sent at 9pm Washington 
time that was equal to 11am on 7 December Tokyo time.
238
 
At the same time the State Department sent FDR‟s letter to Hirohito, the US Naval 
Intelligence Office decoded the first thirteen parts of a fourteen-part reply to Hull‟s 26 November 
memorandum.  The substance of the letter was a review of the deterioration of Japanese-
American diplomacy and an analysis of the 26 November memorandum.  The final part of the 
letter charged the US with conspiring with Britain to stop Japan‟s “new order in Asia” and 
severed diplomatic relations with the US.  The fourteenth point of the letter arrived on December 
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7 before the attack but due to a delay was not presented to Hull until an hour after Japan attacked 
Pearl Harbor on 7 December 1941.  On 8 December, Congress authorized a declaration of war 
against Japan, bringing the US into the Second World War.
239
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CHAPTER 6 
CONCLUSION 
 
The US entered World War I and World War II because of the threat posed by Germany 
in WWI and Japan in WWII.  These dangers threatened the national safety of the US, which 
Presidents Wilson and Roosevelt used to convince Congress to declare war as a measure to 
defend the US.  The physical threat to the US in WWII was greater than it was in WWI.  The 
dangers created by the inability of America‟s allies to defeat their enemies ensured that at some 
point the US would have entered the war.  The similarities in the US entry into both World Wars 
were the American responses to events during the wars.  Aggressive policies in the First and 
Second World Wars by Germany—later Germany and Japan—instilled fears of war in the US 
public.  Prior to American involvement, a strong desire existed in the American public to avoid 
entering the wars because the wars were not an American concern, and because the US should 
not involve itself in foreign issues.  Both of these attitudes demonstrate the inability of the US to 
comprehend the influence of foreign events on American soil. 
To argue the US entered the World Wars because of aggression from another nation 
would be partially correct.  However, this oversimplifies the additional events and trends that 
lent themselves to directing America‟s cause toward intervention.  Events from 1914-1917 and 
1938-1941 greatly influenced American perceptions of its position in the world.  By 
demonstrating that the US could not distance itself from the rest of the world, these wars forced 
Americans to realize they also had a claim in ensuring world security and peace.  The major 
events of the wars demonstrated this reality, while other happenings during the war reinforced 
these changing perceptions. 
94 
 
Public opinion during the World Wars was quite a significant factor in directing the US 
government‟s course of action.  The best examples of public opinion influencing government 
policies were the sinking of the Lusitania in 1915 and the attack on Pearl Harbor in 1941.  Both 
events created an outpouring of public sentiment that was vehemently anti-German in 1915, and 
equally if not more anti-Japanese in 1941.  An interesting note is that in 1915 while the majority 
of Americans were anti-German, most did not want to enter World War I.  The case was the 
opposite in World War II where the majority of Americans did demand the US intervene.  It is 
also important to note that while American lives were lost when the Lusitania sank, the Lusitania 
was a British passenger ship, and Britain was at war with Germany.  This was not the case when 
Japan attacked American forces at Pearl Harbor because the US was not at war with Japan when 
Japan attacked the US Pacific Fleet. 
Japan‟s attack on Pearl Harbor in 1941 drastically affected public opinion.  The American 
public responded to the attack with shock and anger; however, Americans quickly rallied to 
defend democracy from the dangers posed by Japan and Germany.  Americans greatly supported 
the US entrance into WWII partly due to the magnitude of the threat Germany and Japan posed 
to US security, in addition to optimism that the US would defeat them.  The overwhelming 
majority of Americans supported the US entry into the war because the US had been attacked.
240
 
America‟s entry into WWI was due mainly to the actions of Germany beginning in the 
summer of 1914.  In July, Americans watched European events move toward war with 
misunderstanding and composure.  Most Americans were neutral in their attitudes toward the 
belligerent; it was not until August that most biases began to favor the Entente except for 
German- and Irish-Americans.  This was mainly due to Germany‟s refusal to side with Britain to 
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curb Austro-Hungarian aggression.  In addition, Kaiser Wilhelm II‟s failure to restrain Austria 
from starting the war, or failure to support British peace overtures allowed most Americans to 
focus most of the war responsibility on Wilhelm for precipitating and plotting for the war even 
though Britain had also done little to restrain its allies from going to war.  The German invasion 
of Belgium completed the alignment of most American press to the Entente‟s side.241   
World War I saw the American public react to two major warfare policies:  the British 
blockade and German submarine warfare.  The British blockade was viewed as an illegal 
measure, a violation of US neutral rights.  This view softened over time, as Americans became 
accustomed to this method of warfare.  This reconciliation would not be possible for submarine 
warfare, especially after Germany authorized unrestricted attacks on all ships around the British 
coast.   
American resentment against Britain for its actions against American neutral rights had 
reached the point that it could have brought the US into the war against Britain.  However, 
American anger was redirected by Germany‟s submarine warfare.  The sinking of the Lusitania 
on 7 May 1915, was the first experience the American public had with the type of warfare waged 
by the submarine.  The sinking of the Lusitania by a German submarine roused American 
passion and opinion against Germany.  The anti-German resentment in America did not rouse 
public support for declaring war.
242
  Newspapers printed days after the Lusitania‟s sinking 
expressed American resentment and outcry at the “murder” of American citizens by the German 
attack.  The newspapers also included calls for war but most were against declaring war with 
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Germany.
243
  American public opinion also supported theories that the Lusitania had been 
deliberately sunk because the Lusitania sailed from New York City on the same day the German 
Embassy advertised a warning to Americans not to travel on belligerent ships.  Wilson‟s speech 
following the Lusitania added a calming effect against American desires to go to war.
244
  The 
Lusitania case was temporarily settled until the Arabic was attacked. 
The Sussex was attacked on 24 March 1916.  American public responded by resuming its 
demands that diplomatic relations with Germany were severed.  However, the American public 
continued its demands to remain out of the war.  Public opinion was not as vehement as it had 
been in earlier cases mostly because no Americans died when the Sussex was torpedoed; 
however, this did not stop the government from acting.  Americans responded negatively to the 
German government‟s reply to Wilson‟s Sussex note.  Submarine warfare was opposed by most 
Americans; however, the most fervent protests occurred when an American died in an attack.
245
 
American newspapers viewed unrestricted submarine warfare as the deciding factor in 
bringing the US into the war.
246
  The Zimmermann telegram to Mexico added to American ire at 
Germany and began cementing public opinion.  Prior to the Zimmermann telegram, the 
American public was divided into three groups:  those who vehemently advocated fighting 
Germany, those who opposed the war but were determined to defend America‟s national honor, 
and those who wanted to completely keep the US out of the war.
247
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British propaganda was one of the many reasons the American public became aware of 
the war and developed pro-Entente sympathies.  The focus on denouncing German militarism, 
atrocities, and submarine warfare provided the Ententes with the opportunity to positively 
portray their idealistic war aims to the American public and gain support.  While effective and 
influential on public opinion during WWI, propaganda was the sole determinate that brought the 
US into WWI. 
British propaganda was the most effective during WWI by reinforcing American 
opinions on the causes of the war.  This included American opinions on the Kaiser‟s failure to 
control Austria-Hungary and that German militaristic attitudes caused the war.  British 
propagandists released both true and false stories of German atrocities in Belgium to increase 
anti-German sentiments in the US.
248
  Britain was able to use Germany‟s invasion to distract the 
American public from the original cause of the war, the assassination of Archduke Franz 
Ferdinand.  They also hoped that by focusing on the invasion of Belgium, they could eliminate 
isolationists, consolidate the US government, and gain press support for the war.
249
  British 
propaganda was also designed to push American sentiments favorably toward the Ententes, 
preferably to the point that the US would enter the war.   
German propaganda in WWI was designed to strengthen the German position, weaken its 
enemies, and keep the US out of the war.  German propaganda‟s method for discouraging 
American intervention was through discrediting the Entente‟s propaganda.  It attempted to 
accomplish this by noting the violence of the enemies‟ imperialism, the German‟s peaceful 
progress, and by arguing that the German government acted in self-defense.  It also provided 
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elaborate explanations for the German use of mines, interference with neutral rights, sinking 
neutral ships, and using submarine warfare.  However, German propaganda was often ineffective 
and damaging to the German cause in America.  It failed its two objectives:  positively 
influencing American opinion and keeping the US out of the war.  The main reason for this 
failure was the German government‟s declaration of unrestricted submarine warfare.250 
Most Democrats supported an American intervention in WWII in early 1941 before Japan 
attacked Pearl Harbor.  Republicans were still anti-war, but increasingly accepted that America 
might have to enter the war out of necessity.  This change in attitude was the result of increasing 
internationalist thoughts expressed in public opinion.  Pearl Harbor helped to cement 
internationalist logic further by disproving the effectiveness of isolationism and isolationist 
logic.
251
  Many Americans also wanted to avoid any future involvement in European affairs and 
crises after WWI.  Public opinion following WWI was best summarized by “the United States 
always wins the war and losses the peace.”252 
As events in Europe continued to unfold, internationalists wanted to direct American 
policy toward participation in European events, which contradicted with the majority of 
American public opinion.  This majority was uninterested in foreign events and wanted to avoid 
all things associated with war:  death, lost jobs and income, separated families, and the war‟s 
financial costs.  Most Americans continued to prefer keeping the US out of war.  This 
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overwhelming desire to avoid war was a lesson learned from World War I:  nothing good comes 
from war.
253
 
Following Hitler‟s demand for the Sudetenland, anxiety and war fears gripped the US.  
However, FDR was able to calm the American public by reassuring them that the US had no 
political interests in Europe.  The peaceful conclusion at the Munich Conference renewed hopes 
that the US would avoid intervening in Europe again.  November 1938 removed this hope from 
the American public as it resigned itself to the belief that Hitler wanted to conquer more of 
Europe.  Ninety percent of Americans, including FDR and Washington Democrats, held this 
view.
254
   
Japan‟s invasion of China in 1937 provoked international outcry, additional Japanese 
actions in the Sino-Japanese war also created a negative image of Japan in the minds of the 
American public.  Americans viewed the battle of Shanghai and the rape of Nanjing as part of 
Japanese brutality, and Japan incurred the moral indignations of the American people.  Most 
Americans viewed Japan as a weak people at this time, which increased US policy makers‟ 
willingness to enact harsher policies against Japan.
255
 
The minority views of Americans supported preparedness; however, they preferred a 
slow build up of American military forces.  Ambassador Breckinridge Long statement supports 
this view, “Better keep your mouth shut and make a few more battleships.  Hitler has not made a 
mistake yet…The thing to do is to prepare for the time he will make that mistake and not 
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interrupt him while he is making it.”256  Germany‟s invasion of Czechoslovakia and Poland in 
1939 changed many Congressional opinions.
257
  Germany‟s invasion of Poland on 1 September, 
instilled anxiety in the public and created anti-German attitudes.  FDR informed the American 
public that in spite of German aggression, “I hope the United States will keep out of this war.  I 
believe that it will.”258  Americans did not overwhelmingly support the Allies at the beginning of 
WWII as they had in WWI; in fact, many Americans were biased against the Allies for their 
behavior and propaganda in WWI.  Americans also blamed the Allies for appeasing Hitler 
thereby encouraging his aggression.
259
 
The signing of the Tripartite Pact in September 1940 by Germany, Japan, and Italy 
provoked hawks in Washington to press FDR to embargo oil to Japan.  They also urged FDR to 
send the fleet to Singapore.
260
  America responded to international events by committing the US 
to provide the Allies with all aid short of actually fighting in the war.  The American public by 
1940 had come to view the time for appeasement had ended.
261
  An overwhelming majority of 
Americans at this time were committed to defeating Hitler without involving the US.
262
  The 
Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor provided Americans with the opportunity to comprehend how 
vulnerable they were to foreign events by accepting isolationism.  The attack also united 
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Americans to fighting the threat posed by the Axis powers and created overwhelming support for 
the 8 December declaration of war. 
This changing attitude was effective because of significant events during the wars, 
Presidents Wilson‟s and Roosevelt‟s resulting policies and public opinion.  WWI and WWII 
have one specific event that is viewed as directing the US toward active involvement in the wars.  
In WWI, the event was the sinking of the Lusitania, and in WWII, the attack on Pearl Harbor.  
The sinking of the Lusitania in WWI propelled American biases against Germany for costing 
almost 1,200 people their lives including 128 American citizens.  This sinking of the Lusitania 
caused some Americans to demand the US enter the war while the majority demanded 
concessions from Germany for the deaths.   
The sinking of the Lusitania was not the event that finally pushed the US into WWI; this 
was Germany‟s declaration of unrestricted submarine warfare in February 1917.  However, 
during the war the sinking of the Lusitania repeatedly revived American sentiments against 
Germany.  The attack on Pearl Harbor united the American public against Japan for its 
unprovoked attack.  The American public passionately supported the war as a necessity to 
protect American lives and defend American values.  Unlike the sinking of the Lusitania, the 
attack on Pearl Harbor was immediately met with demands for American action, which brought 
the US into the Second World War. 
The sinking of the Lusitania was a result of German submarine warfare.  However, the 
start of unrestricted submarine warfare convinced the US to enter the war as Germany attacked 
all ships bound for Europe in retaliation for the British blockade.  The attack on Pearl Harbor 
was Japan‟s attempt to eliminate the obstacle posed by the US at Pearl Harbor to its conquest of 
the Asia.  The nature of these policies and their results contradicted with American principles 
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because Wilson rejected the German method of retaliation and FDR rejected Japan‟s expansion 
into South East Asia. 
Wilson‟s war policies from 1914 to 1917 affected the direction of American involvement 
in WWI.  During the war, Wilson repeatedly attempted to use the neutral offices of the US to 
appeal to the Entente and Central Powers to accept a mediated peace.  Wilson‟s attempts 
eventually came to failure because the belligerents were more dedicated to achieving a military 
victory to force peace terms favorable to the victor.  Through America‟s neutrality, Wilson and 
the US demonstrated a majority preference for the Ententes and Britain.  This preference to the 
Ententes took away from Wilson‟s position as a peace mediator with the Central Powers as did 
his strong stand against Germany‟s submarine warfare.  During WWI, Wilson was less able to 
gain concessions from Britain than he was from German.  This lack of compromise with Britain 
forced the US to acquiesce to the British blockade out of necessity and because most of 
America‟s trade, economic, and finances were tied with Britain.   
Wilson did not totally align the US with the Entente until the US entered the war in 1917, 
though the majority of Americans were pro-Entente if not pro-British.  During his presidency, 
Wilson attempted to guide American public opinion and understanding of the war because he 
recognized the power of public opinion over politics and government policies.  He understood 
that the public opinion of Americans was the true leader of the government and that it was ever 
changing.  Wilson also recognized the power the American press had influencing the direction of 
public opinion, that the news often had more power than politicians had over public opinion on 
national issues.   
Wilson‟s moves for peace in November and December of 1916 were not well received by 
the American press.  American newspapers argued the peace terms would soothe the German 
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government and weaken the Entente‟s determination to expel militarism from Germany and 
install a democratic government.  Other newspapers called Wilson‟s efforts cowardly and an 
ambitious blunder.  Few Americans believed that Wilson‟s attempts would succeed and end the 
war because Germany would not give up the territory of Alsace-Lorraine without recouping its 
colonies.  Americans also believed that without peace terms the war would not end unless one 
side decidedly won or the people of Germany and Austria-Hungary revolted.
263
  Unfortunately, 
Wilson‟s declaration of war was unable to unite Americans for the war effort as strong willed 
pacifist Senators continued attempts to keep the US out of the war.
264
  American public opinion 
in WWI never unified before the war declaration unlike public opinion in WWII, which did unify 
to support America‟s entry into WWII. 
FDR‟s war policies from 1939 to 1941 affected America‟s involvement in WWII as 
Wilson‟s had in WWI.  Unlike Wilson, FDR did not try to enforce strict neutrality in the US 
while he originally supported the Neutrality Acts of the 1930s that abrogated American neutral 
rights from WWI.  During the war, German and Japanese invasions in Europe and Southeast 
Asia respectively provided FDR with a foundation for biases against Germany and Japan.  
FDR‟s policy was designed to keep the US out of war though it eventually changed as the war 
progressed.  As German and Japanese offensives were successful, FDR was persuaded by events 
to align the US with the Allies; eventually, this also progressed to providing Britain with all aid 
short of entering the war.  FDR‟s policy for aiding Britain included the destroyers-for-bases deal, 
Lend-Lease, and escorting convoys to Europe.  Part of this alliance rested on the relationship 
between FDR and Churchill that began in 1939.  During WWII, FDR was more concerned with 
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Germany and Europe than with Japanese expansion in Southeast Asia.  This changed as Japan‟s 
expansion progressed and began creating concerns that it would deny the Allies access to their 
colonies‟ resources, forcing FDR to authorize stronger policies against Japan.   
In 1939, FDR asked Congress to increase national defense spending in response to 
increased aggression in the world.  Yet, some Washington officials argued against increased 
military spending; in addition, isolationists argued that increased military spending would not 
deter Hitler from his plans or minimize possible threats on the US from Europe.
265
  The 
opposition against military spending was strong enough to prevent FDR‟s plans, especially 
because the majority of Americans agreed that there were not any reasons to do so.  Most 
Americans continued to hold strong to the belief that America should not involve itself in a 
European conflict.  These Americans viewed attempts to strengthen the military as a step toward 
war.
266
 
While Wilson‟s and FDR‟s policies differed, some of their actions created similar results 
as the US increasingly drew toward the British during the war and created stronger policies 
against Britain‟s enemies.  The similarities in FDR‟s and Wilson‟s policies were that they both 
drew the US into cooperating with the Allies whether it was through acquiescence or active aid 
to the Allied war effort.  They were both personally pro-British and anti-German, although FDR 
was more anti-Hitler than anti-German.  Wilson‟s and FDR‟s policies were partially successful 
because they were responses to foreign events.  The other part of the success of their policies was 
from public opinion that responded similarly to the original event.   
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In addition, FDR and Wilson had similar ideas for creating a postwar world, although 
their methods for initiating it were different.  In WWI, Wilson was adamant that to create world 
peace he would have to get the Entente and Central Powers to agree to peace terms, and he 
dedicated most of his time during the war to this process.  On the other hand, FDR was equally 
adamant that to create world peace aggressive nations would have to be defeated before any 
attempts at world peace could be initiated.  While, Wilson and FDR had differing views of how 
to create a postwar world, they both had similar plans to achieve it.  At the end of WWI, Wilson 
publicized his fourteen points to develop the postwar world; these fourteen points were designed 
mostly to ensure national sovereignty and territorial integrity.  It was also anti-British empire in 
that many of the points undermined the principles the British Empire was built upon.  In August 
1941, FDR convinced Churchill to sign the Atlantic Charter.   
While the Atlantic Charter was not as in depth as Wilson‟s fourteen points, it was still a 
blueprint for the postwar world that focused on the main issues that had set off WWII.  
Ironically, Churchill did not want to sign the Atlantic Charter because it shared similar directives 
with the fourteen points that were contrary to British desires.  The similarities between the 
fourteen points and the Atlantic Charter was FDR‟s adoption of Wilsonian ideas pertaining to the 
creation of world peace after WWII, and both men‟s desire to create world peace after these two 
devastating wars. 
Public opinion in WWI did not completely coalesce when Congress declared war against 
Germany, nor did it completely support the Entente‟s war effort.  During WWI, most Americans 
were biased towards the Entente although Irish and German Americans were not.  However, 
Entente war policies prevented them from gaining complete support from the Americans to the 
levels that would encourage American intervention in the war.  American support for the Entente 
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was partially influenced by German actions; it was also diminished by the British blockade.  In 
addition, British propaganda in WWI was greatly effective in turning the American public 
against Germany.  British propaganda was aided by the ineffectiveness of German propaganda. 
In WWII, foreign propaganda was less effective because Americans rejected it after 
learning the truth behind many of the propaganda stories and because Americans were strongly 
against entering another European war.  American opinions of the war were influenced by 
German and Japanese aggression and attacks on civilian populations.  These events persuaded 
Americans to abandon isolationism for internationalism and interventionism.  As the war 
progressed, Americans increasingly adopted internationalism while others staunchly opposed US 
intervention.  Until Japan attacked Pearl Harbor, most believed the Allies could defeat Germany 
and Japan without Americans actually fighting.  After 7 December, most Americans believed the 
US needed to enter the war.     
The US entrance into WWI and WWII was based on many factors including actual war 
events, presidential policies, and public opinion.  These influences jointly worked to bring the 
US into the wars.  Actual war events were the greatest influence, while Wilson‟s and FDR‟s 
policies and public opinion provided additional support that persuaded the US to enter the World 
Wars.  While the events, policies, and public opinion differed from WWI to WWII, similar 
results came from their combined influences. 
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